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Comment on Contemporary A ffairs by the Editor 
The Legacy of Vietnam 
For almost a decade now, Vietnam has hung like a 
dreadful pall over the conduct of American foreign 
policy. And the end is nowhere in sight. Vietnam di-
vided us more than any issue in memory and it divides 
us still: only through a process of willed collective am-
nesia have we managed to keep it from tearing us 
further apart. The current PBS series, Vietnam: A Tele-
vision History, has aroused expectations that the nation 
may finally be ready for its long-delayed reckoning 
with the Vietnam experience, but there is reason to 
doubt that any sort of common assessment of that dis-
astrous episode is yet possible. 
Vietnam was a wound in the heart for which we are 
not yet ready to find healing. There is for it no recollec-
tion in tranquility; its pain is still raw and immediate. 
All wars leave scars, but Vietnam constitutes an endur-
ing disfigurement. Part of that-no small part-is that 
Vietnam is a war we lost. War is hell only for losers; 
victorious wars bestow, for all their agony, a redeeming 
legacy of satisfaction and honor. Victory means vindi-
cation. Defeat, on the other hand, inevitably brings into 
question the cause in whose name the struggle orig-
inated. Loss carries with it a presumption of ignoble 
purposes. 
Yet even had we won there, Vietnam would have left 
an ambiguous legacy, much in the manner of the Mexi-
can and Spanish-American wars. Like those earlier 
conflicts, Vietnam raised questions regarding its orig-
inal ends that victory alone could not have eradicated . 
It became a battlefield of ideas, an occasion for creating 
new divisions in American society even as it exposed 
and deepened others that already existed. It is for that 
reason that we find it difficult to talk frankly about Viet-
nam today: it remains an ideological timebomb. 
That is not to say that we do not speak of Vietnam. 
Indeed, politicians and commentators invoke its "les-
sons" endlessly and apply them with glib facility to 
every issue that comes into sight. But we are as slow to 
agree on the precise meaning of those lessons as we are 
quick to invoke their existence. It is only by a process 
of polite evasion that we ignore the open fact that Viet-
nam means whatever on any given occasion any given 
individual chooses it to mean. 
Yet that is not quite right. There is one judgment on 
Vietnam common to virtually all observers-and that 
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is that it was a horrendous mistake. Even those who 
continue to insist on the nobility, or at least the legiti-
macy, of our aims there concede that the war was so 
badly fought that it cost us terribly in the end. But if 
we can all agree that Vietnam was a failed war, we agree 
not at all as to the meaning of that failure. 
It would be easier if we could keep the argument 
contained. Vietnam would not bedevil us if all that 
were at stake was disagreement on how the war was 
carried on or whether it was ever ours to win in the first 
place. Those questions surely exist. Could the war have 
ended favorably had we fought it differently? Did we 
employ incorrect strategy? Did we raise the level of con-
flict too gradually, allowing the enemy to match every 
incremental escalation? Were the communist forces in 
the North so strong and determined that victory could 
only have been attained by the virtual destruction of 
Vietnamese society? Were the non-communist forces in 
the South so weak and disorganized that no amount of 
aid on our part could have sustained them in independ-
ent existence? 
These are essential questions, necessary to any useful 
analysis of the Vietnam experience. They are also ca-
pable of being answered without drawing the nation into 
embittered ideological warfare. A broad consensus may 
already exist on many of the issues that the questions 
raise. Most people now agree that America can only 
intervene in situations that promise quick victories not 
too dearly bought. The American people will not sup-
port prolonged and ambiguous military efforts. The 
ends for which we fight must be clear and attainable, 
and the local forces on whose side we fight must be en-
gaged in a defensible cause that they are themselves 
determined and able, with limited help, to see to vic-
tory. No more protracted twilight struggles; no more 
efforts on behalf merely of the lesser evil. No more 
Vietnams. 
Yet the conflict over Vietnam does not end with the 
resolution of questions concerning the prudence of our 
intervention or the suitability of the means employed 
to pursue the war. The essential question that remains, 
the one still entirely unresolved, is not "Could we have 
won?" but rather "Should we have won?" Antiwar critics 
protested not the war's strategy or wisdom but its moral-
ity. Most Americans turned against the war in the end 
because they determined that we could not gain victory, 
but those for whom opposition to the war became a 
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After Vietnam, politics no longer stopped "at the water's edge"; the collapse of consensus 
inevitably brought with it the breakdown of bipartisan agreement on major foreign policy issues. 
moral imperative dreaded that we would. For these peo-
ple, "no more Vietnams" is a moral outcry, not an ex-
pression of political or strategic calculation. 
Vietnam left as its most fateful legacy the destruction 
of the postwar consensus on American foreign relations. 
After Vietnam, appeals to collective security (the very 
term now seems quaint) or to containment of communist 
expansion could no longer arouse the near-universal 
favorab le response they once called forth; indeed, such 
appeals are today regarded with instinctive and wide-
spread suspicion. The foreign policy consensus has 
collapsed because the common set of values and atti-
tudes concerning America and its place in the world 
that lay behind it has collapsed. Prior to Vietnam, de-
bates on foreign policy took place over the narrow ques-
tion of the proper application of American power in 
the pursuit of American purposes. Few doubted the 
legitimacy, in proper circumstances, of the use of that 
power; virtually no one questioned the rightness of 
those purposes. 
Protest against the war in Vietnam accordingly be-
gan over the question of whether the situation there 
provided a proper occasion for the use of American 
power. But the protest, like the war, escalated. There 
is no point here retracing the melancholy path that 
debate over the war followed. By the end of it the radi-
cal critics had come to see America (or Am erika) as a 
malign presence everywhere in the world, and they 
concluded that a society that could produce so mon-
strous an evil as Vietnam must be essentially corrupt 
at the core. 
That was never more than a minority view, of course, 
but enough overflow from the radical critique seeped 
into liberal thinking to undermine the self-confidence 
and sense of purpose of liberal policy elites. With loss 
of confidence and purpose came loss of will. Before long 
liberal spokesmen, who had for so long advocated a 
vigorous foreign policy, found themselves customarily 
urging caution and restraint in the exercise of power, 
admonishing earlier administrations for their "inordi-
nate fear of communism," and in general rationalizing 
the retreat of American influence. Part of the new mod-
eration reflected new conditions, but much of it 
stemmed from massive guilt reflexes over Vietnam. 
After Vietnam, politics no longer stopped "at the 
water's edge"; the collapse of consensus inevitably 
brought with it the breakdown of bipartisan agreement 
on major foreign policy issues. Presidents may invoke 
considerations of national security for all they are 
worth, but it is now widely assumed that in foreign 
affairs, equally with domestic issues, the duty of the 
opposition is to oppose. Consensus only reappears when 
opposition politicians find it prudent, for political rea-
sons, to rally 'round the flag. 
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Actually, there are strong signs of a new consensus 
emerging behind a policy of neo-isolationism. Isola-
tionism has always been a dominant impulse among 
conservatives, one overcome only with great reluctance 
in the post-World War II era. Vietnam reawakened that 
impulse. Few conservatives saw Vietnam as a moral 
issue, but for many of them it revived the conviction 
that Americans have no good reason to get involved in 
the affairs of other nations. Conservatives typically con-
clude that Americans will be corrupted by excessive 
contact with foreigners, while liberals are inclined to 
see things the other way around, but the policy result 
in either case points in the same direction: a withdrawal 
of American power and influence in the world. Most 
conservatives think George McGovern's view of the 
world absurd and sentimental, but while they will spend 
more on America's defense than McGovern, they share 
with him a desire to keep the nation free of foreign 
entanglements. 
What all this adds up to is uncertain. Under the new 
dispensation, America is less likely than before to stum-
ble into foreign adventures in which it cannot prevail 
nor from which it will be unable to disentangle itself. 
Nothing ventured, nothing lost. The new isolationism 
can present itself as the new maturity. Vietnam taught 
us limits, and there is much to be said for that. 
Yet it is difficult to believe that all this is for the better. 
The lessons of Vietnam have been overlearned where 
they have not been mislearned. A bungle is not a crime. 
The moral principle that America violated in Vietnam 
involved the rule of proportionality: the destruction we 
caused was incommensurate with the good we had rea-
sonable hope of obtaining. But that could be seen clearly 
only in retrospect. America miscalculated in Vietnam, 
but by the time the size of the miscalculation became 
apparent, there was no easy way for us to withdraw with 
dignity and without leaving helpless before their ene-
mies those who had come to depend on our support. 
We should resist the suggestion that because our in-
tervention in Vietnam turned out badly, all conceivable 
American interventions will turn out the same way. We 
need to learn from our Vietnam experience, not be 
paralyzed by it. There need be no apology on grounds 
either of morality or interest for resistance to establish-
ment of new Marxist-Leninist regimes. We must resist 
with discretion, but we must resist. And that will not 
be possible if we are beguiled by isolationist fantasies 
based in concepts either of a "fortress Ameri~a" or of a 
world inclined our way simply by the earnestness of 
our moral intentions. Vietnam should have taught us 
about limits and ambiguity, but, recognizing those 
limits and acknowledging that ambiguity, we still must 
choose and, having chosen, act. 
•• •• 
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Individuals in Community 
We too easily forget that however much liberal indi-
vidualism may be a product of our modern, industrial-
ized world, it is also the product of Christendom. If 
there is truth in St. Augustine's assertion that the human 
heart is restless until it rests in God, the human person 
can never belong entirely to any historical community, 
and human virtue can never be defined sufficiently in 
terms of good citizenship. 
That this is a lesson too easily forgotten even by sen-
sitive interpreters of our Western tradition is evident 
in George Will's recent statement of his theory of pol-
itics.! The book's preface is preceded by an epigraph 
quoting a famous passage from Cicero: 
Well , then , a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people 
is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of 
way. but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an 
agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common 
good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weak-
ness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has 
implanted in man. 
When, then, on the very first page of the first chapter 
Will describes his undertaking as "Augustinian," the 
reader may anticipate that Cicero is to be Will's foil. 
For the passage Will quotes from Cicero is famous pri-
marily because of Augustine's treatment of it in his City 
of God. Augustine first cites Cicero's definition of a 
commonwealth in II,21, and says that later, "God will-
ing," he will attempt to show that according to Cicero's 
definition Rome itself was never a true commonwealth. 
Pages-and years!-later, in XIX,21, Augustine returns 
to his promise. He argues that if a commonwealth re-
Gilbert C. Meilaender, Jr. teaches religion at Oberlin Col-
lege. He is the author of The Taste for the Other: The 
Social and Ethical Thought of C. S. Lewis and of Friend-
ship: A Study in Theological Ethics. His most recent 
article t'n The Cresset, "Christians and the Nuclear D£lemma: 
An Unfashionable View, " appeared last November. An 
earlier version of the present essay was read to the Symposium 
on Individual and Community sponsored by the Center of 
Theological Inquiry at Princeton Seminary in May, 1983. The 
author wishes to thank the members of the symposium for 
their readiness to listen and their equally ready willt'ngness to 
raise critical questions. · 
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An Augustinian Vision 
Gilbert C. Meilaender, Jr. 
quires people agreed with respect to justice, there can 
be no commonwealth where God is not loved above all 
else. And, Augustine knows, there are no such political 
communities. He therefore proposes a more reasonable 
definition, one which demythologizes politics and 
undercuts the pretensions of government. A people is 
simply "a multitude of reasonable beings voluntarily 
associated in the pursuit of common interests" (XIX,24). 
Commonwealths will be better or worse according as 
the interests which unite their people are better or 
worse. But when subjected to theological scrutiny, all 
political communities, even the very best, are analo-
gous to bands of robbers. 
The answer which a captured pirate gave to the celebrated Alex-
ander the Great was perfectly accurate and correct. When that king 
asked the man what he meant by infesting the sea. he boldly replied : 
"What you mean by warring on the whole world . I do my fighting on 
a tiny ship. and they call me a pirate ; you do yours with a large 
fleet , and they call you Commander" (JV.4 ). 
That is what Augustine does to Cicero's definition of 
a commonwealth. And we may be surprised, therefore, 
that Will's "Augustinian" undertaking should be to 
argue that "statecraft is soulcraft." "Politics should," 
he writes, "share one purpose with religion: the steady 
emancipation of the individual through the education 
of his passions" (p. 27). Augustine demythologized the 
political. Our task, Will writes, is to "reclaim for politics 
a properly great and stately jurisdiction" (p. 22). Virtue 
Will defines as "good citizenship" (p. 134). For Augus-
tine the virtue of the very best of citizens-of a Regulus 
(!,15)-was only splendid vice. 
That George Will's undertaking is not, in the most 
important sense, Augustinian does not mean that he is 
not an acute and thoughtful observer of the society in 
which we live. That the individualism of our world 
often seems destructive, that we demonstrate little will-
ingness to sacrifice private desires for public ends-
these contentions of his would be hard to deny. We 
need, therefore, to think carefully about the relation of 
individual and community. And it soon becomes clear 
that this is also to think about the relation of ethics and 
politics. 
I will develop the thesis, certainly not original with 
1 George F. Will . Statecraft as Sou/craft: What Government Does 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). 
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The freedom important in a liberal stat e is the freedom t o p urs ue one's private purposes, however 
defined, as long as they are pursued within the boundaries established by the shared sys t em of rules . 
me, that good ethics may not be good politics. That, in 
particular, some things we may need to say (ethically) 
about the relation of persons and their communities 
are dangerous as guides to political life. That what is 
best politically probably falls short of our highest moral 
ideals. I intend, that is, an Augustinian undertaking. 
Or, one could say, I hope to support a version of the 
liberal tradition in Western political thought. At the 
conclusion of his famous essay, "Two Concepts of Lib-
erty," Isaiah Berl in suggests that the civilized person 
is one who recognizes the (merely) relative validity of 
his convictions, yet stands by them. And Berlin writes: 
"To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and in-
curable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine 
one's practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and 
more dangerous, moral and political immaturity."2 We 
have what may justly be called a deep metaphysical 
need to become persons of a certain sort, virtuous selves. 
And there is truth to the claim (made, for example, by 
George Will) that such virtue can be developed only in 
communities of a certain sort. But there is also truth-
or so I will argue-in the claim that such communities 
2 Isaiah Berlin. Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press . 
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are dangerous. 
To develop this argument I will draw upon the 
thought of Isaiah Berlin and of Michael Walzer, each a 
perceptive political theorist. I offer no adequate inter-
pretation of their views but will simply use them-the 
one, a great defender of liberty; the other, an advocate 
of fraternal solidarity-to help sketch three ways of 
understanding the relation between individuals and 
their political communities. Each is, of course, an ideal 
type which exists nowhere; yet, the sketch will call to 
our attention certain features of life in community. 
Each type has its own understanding of virtue and of 
the relation between freedom and virtue. Each has its 
own view of the relative importance of participation in 
the common life and sacrifice for that common life. Each 
presumes a view about the relation of ethics and politics. 
The first may be said to be one form- but only one-of 
the liberal tradition. The second is a form of that ancient 
tradition-a fraternal understanding of public life-
which Will suggests we recapture. The third is also a 
form of the liberal tradition , but one tinged with Aug-
ustinian presuppositions. 3 
I. Politics Without Ethics: The Night- Watchman State 
The point of government may be the provision of a 
system of rules by which citizens order their associations 
with each other. In that case, the political community-
as a community-is going nowhere in particular, has 
no particular goal or mission in life. As Michael Walzer 
writes, "a liberal nation can have no collective pur-
pose."4 The freedom important in such a community is 
the freedom to pursue one's private purposes, whatever 
they may be, as long as they are pursued within the 
boundaries established by the shared system of rules. 
Two different sorts of ethical premises may underlie 
such a conception of government-one emphasized 
more by Walzer, the other by Berlin. But both have 
been central in the liberal tradition. We may, on the 
one hand, emphasize that selves are "bundles of inter-
ests," necessarily clashing with each other. As Walzer 
puts it, in a fine development of a Hobbesian metaphor, 
"in a race, one has competitors, not colleagues or com-
rades" (RP,294). Alternatively, we may think of the self 
not as a bundle of interests but as a "repository of imag-
inative possibilities.''5 That is, we may emphasize not 
3 My scheme is considerably influ enced by Philip Abbott 's Furious 
Fancies: American Political Th ought in the Post-Liberal Era (West-
port . Connecticut : Greenwood Press. 1980 ). 
4 Michael Walzer, Radical Principles: Reflections of an Unreconstructed 
Democrat (New York: Basic Books. 1980 ). p. 69. Hereafter abbre-
vi ated as RP. 
5 The language describing selves as " bundles of interests" or " reposi-
tories of imaginative poss ibilities" is taken from Abboll . p. 243. 
The Cresset 
Critics of liberalism have pointed out t hat a politically liberal society does violence 
to a profound ethical t rut h: we need cooperat ive endeavor to flourish as human beings. 
the clash of interests but the irreducible plurality of 
ends in life. Isaiah Berlin notes, in an essay on John 
Stuart Mill , that Mill 's commitment must (or should) 
have been not to liberty as a means to other ends but as 
a good desirable in its own right. For example, suppose 
we defend freedom as a means to the emergence of truth. 
It is arguable that a love of truth is as likely to emerge 
in a strictly disciplined society as in a more liberal , 
toleran t one. We may, of course, fondly hope that free-
dom will prove the way to truth , but if it does not, a 
liberal like Mill would have to choose between freedom 
and truth (FEL,l28). 
That freedom will prove the way to virtue is perhaps 
even less likely. Indeed, within the parameters of this 
firs t ideal type, it will be hard to say much about virtue. 
If we talk of it at all, it is likely to be what Walzer terms 
"civility": social virtues such as orderliness and polite-
ness (RP,59). The political community recognizes a 
plurality of forms of the good life and must therefore 
have difficulty nourishing and sustaining any particu-
lar set of virtues. Content to establish boundaries which 
control conflicts of interest among citizens, government 
must necessarily aim at a kind of lowest common de-
nominator virtue. 
This may not seem bad. We might suggest that incul-
cating "higher" visions of virtue must be the task of 
smaller groups within the community. But there is 
danger in what we may picture as a "seepage" problem. 
When enshrined at the center of our public conscious-
ness is the minimal virtue which asks only civility, when 
our common life acknowledges a plurality of forms of 
the good life and the need for freedom to pursue our 
private visions of the good life-when these are the be-
liefs upon which our community is founded-it will be 
difficult to prevent a belief in the primacy of private 
interests from seeping down into and dominating our 
understanding of virtue. Serious moral education, ser-
ious training in virtue, may then become difficult to 
sustain. We may even have difficulty sustaining the 
common life of smaller groups upon which we are rely-
ing to transmit those "higher" elements of our moral 
VISIOn. 
In this community participation in public life can 
scarcely be of any great value. In fact, it is more likely 
to be an onerous chore-necessary perhaps on occasion, 
but hardly the sort of activity to which one is devoted. 
Hence, Isaiah Berlin notes that for those who value 
primarily the freedom to pursue their private visions, 
self-government may be of relatively little importance. 
Such a view has been memorably expressed by Michael 
Oakeshott: "Politics is a second-rate form of activity ... 
at once corrupting to the soul and fatiguing to the mind, 
the activity either of those who cannot live without the 
illusion of affairs or those so fearful of being ruled by 
November, 1983 
others that they will pay away their lives to prevent it."6 
If it is necessary to secure their freedom, citizens of a 
liberal community will be self-governing. But if more 
freedom is to be found under a benevolent despot, who 
sees to public concerns and leaves our evenings free, the 
despot may be choiceworthy. It's just that despots are 
notoriously hard to control. Since we can't trust them, 
we must sometimes "pay away" our lives to check them, 
we must become active participants in public life-at 
least for a time. But that participation is never more 
than a necessary evil. 
Finally, it is worth asking how prone to warlike activ-
ity such a society might be. In many ways the right 
answer seems to be that no community would be less 
warlike. Indeed, as Walzer writes , "the great advantage 
of liberal society may simply be this: that no one can be 
asked to die for public reasons or on behalf of the state."7 
Indeed, the traditional American dislike for conscrip-
tion, for the idea that the political community can have 
a claim on our lives for a period of public service, is 
inherent in the liberal tradition (RP,57). War is, then, a 
danger to liberal communities. In times of danger we 
have to band together, give up pursuit of private pro-
jects, and sacrifice for the common good. Those who 
are not enticed by the thought of common enterprises 
seem unlikely to be tempted by the ultimate common 
enterprise: war. 
And yet ... critics of liberalism have noted that from 
the perspective of those seeking to govern a liberal 
society there may be temptation to think of war as some-
thing desirable . Governing a community of those who 
wish mainly to be left alone must often seem a thankless 
task, tempting one to seek ways of creating an artificial 
solidarity. What better way than a fit of patriotic senti-
ment brought on by the danger of an enemy? Indeed, if 
Berlin is correct to suggest that we have "a deep and 
incurable metaphysical need" to transform our private 
self with its individual vision and projects into a public 
self which sacrifices for others, we might suspect that a 
politically liberal society does violence to a profound 
ethical truth: We need cooperative endeavor to flourish 
as human beings. This element of human nature cannot 
perhaps be entirely suppressed, and the suppressed de-
sire for solidarity may be suddenly and easily trans-
formed-if the right occasion presents itself-into a 
desire to lose oneself in the cause of one's country. This 
will be especially true if "seepage" has corrupted the 
other bonds of association in which this basic human 
6 Michael Oakeshott. " Introduction"' to Hobbes' Leviathan (Oxford : 
Basil Blackwell , 1955 ). p. lxiv. 
7 Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and 
Citizenship (New York : Simon and Schuster. l 970). p. 89 . Hereafter 
abbreviated as 0. 
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solidarity believes that virtue must be the way t o freedom- or , at least, to "true freedom ." 
need might find some satisfaction . 
II. An Ethical Politics: The Fraternal Community 
The great alternative to the tradition of liberal indi-
vidualism is the fraternal community in which citizens 
take care to shape each other's character, in which the 
individual feels an emotional solidarity with the com-
munity, and in which it is possible to find one's "true 
self" by participating in the life of the larger commun-
ity. In such a community statecraft will surely involve 
soulcraft. It is worth noting, though, that fraternal com-
munities within Western history have often been pater-
nal as well ; it is, after all , government that must do the 
"crafting." Hence, it is not surprising that in explaining 
that statecraft must be soulcraft George Will should turn 
to the image of parents disciplining and shaping chil-
dren. The tendency within some forms of Christian 
thought to take the commandment enjoining children 
to honor their parents as applicable also to political life 
is an example of the ease with which familial images 
may make their way into our conception of political 
community. 
The ethical premise which underlies this vision of 
government-a true premise, I believe-is that the 
isolated individual is not fully human, and that there 
is a single good life in which one must participate in 
order to become fully human and overcome the deep 
division within the self. We should not overlook the 
kind of language-religious language-which seems 
appropriate here. Rousseau was one of the great theo-
rists of fraternal community, and Walzer writes of 
Rousseau's social contract that it 
represents less a n exchange than a moral tra nsformation. . Into 
the state. according to this interpretation. a man brings the life 
which he has received from the bounty of nature and which is wholly 
hi s own. From the state , th at is, from the shared ex periences a nd 
general will of the political community. he receives a second life. a 
moral life. which is not his sole possession, but whose reali ty depend s 
upon the continued existence of his fellow-citizens a nd of their 
association ( 0. 9 1 ). 
The citizen "belongs" to the fraternal community from 
which he has rece ived his new and better self-a com-
munal self now, no longer a self caught up in a world of 
private desires and projects. 
Walzer is correct, I think, to suggest that we do long 
for something like this and that liberal society fails to 
meet this important moral need of human nature. Ber-
lin is equally correct, I think, to warn that such a com-
mon life, however we may long for it, can quickly be-
come oppressive. Walzer writes: "Liberalism, even at 
its most permissive, is a hard politics because it offers 
so few emotional rewards; the liberal state is not a home 
for its citizens; it lacks warmth and intimacy" (RP,68) . 
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True enough. But the implicit suggestion is that the 
political community should and might offer a "home"-
might, that is, overcome the deep division within the 
self of which Berlin writes. And if our choices are be-
tween liberal individualism which makes no such pre-
tension and fraternal solidarity's offer of a "home," 
those who have learned from Augustine's City of God 
ought to step to Berlin's side, though not without regret 
that so sensitive a companion as Walzer must disagree. 
We must say of the advocates of fraternal community 
what Augustine says of Sallust, whom he regarded as 
among the most honest of Roman historians: Even Sal-
lust praised Rome too highly-which is not surprising, 
says Augustine , since he had no other city to praise 
(III,l7). 
If the tradition of political liberalism thinks of free-
dom as the way to virtue, the community of fraternal 
solidarity believes that virtue must be the way to free-
dom-or, at least, to "true freedom ." It offers not the 
night-watchman state but the educative state. Virtue 
here is the first step, the primary commitment. Govern-
ment- and citizens in their self-governing capacities-
must take a concern to shape the virtue of the commun-
ity's members. And if the liberal tradition had to hope 
that virtue would result from a commitment to freedom, 
it is just as true to say that the fraternal tradition can 
only hope that virtuous citizens will be jealous of each 
other's liberty, even the liberty of those less virtuous. 
For this tradition it is virtue, not the virtues, which 
counts-civic virtue, a politicized concept of virtue. In 
Philip Abbott 's words, citizens "throw themselves into 
the management of the republic and so, we are told, gain 
in the exhilaration of fraternity what they lose in their 
loss of self."8 Indeed, when we think this way we may 
tend to equate virtue and civic virtue, the good citizen 
and the virtuous human being, ethics and politics. Such 
communities can be more successful in the inculcation 
of virtue, but only because they do not recognize that 
deep and incurable metaphysical tension which , for all 
its defects, the liberal tradition has seen: the tension 
between the individual made finally for God and the 
claims of any historical community. 
It should be clear that within the tradition of fra-
ternal solidarity participation in the public life of the 
community will be highly prized. Not because such par-
ticipation is necessary if the community is to be healthy, 
nor because it is necessary to foster a common good, but 
simply because such participation is the common good. 
After all , in participating in the common life we set 
aside our self-interested individualism and find that 
better self who seeks his good only in the good of others. 
In losing our life within the community we find it-
8 Abbott . p. 40. 
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Proponents of fraternal solidarity seek to blend politics and ethics more than we can and 
they attempt a premature resolution of the essential tension between individual and community. 
and find thereby in political activity a kind of salvation. 
We should be under no illusion that this can happen 
easily. Walzer suggests that the citizen characterized 
by civic virtue will be "the product of collective repres-
sion and self-discipline" ( 0 ,232). But in that repression 
lies perfect freedom . This is the key to the educative 
state, the fraternal community : Only the virtuous are 
free, and the virtuous must first be shaped and disci-
plined. An important moral insight, true to the needs 
of our nature. But politically dangerous. 
The necessary collective discipline may be most easily 
achieved and our sense of ourselves as participants in a 
collective undertaking most readily nourished when we 
perceive over against ourselves a common enemy. The 
intimacy of fra.ternal community, the sense of belonging 
it provides, requires the presence of outsiders. It is 
sobering to be reminded by Walzer of Hegel's insistence 
that the state achieves its true universality only in time 
of war and that war is therefore necessary for the ethical 
health of the political community ( 0 ,184). Seeking in 
fraternal community a cure for the division within may 
require division without, outsiders over against whom 
our community can know itself as a community to which 
some belong because others do not. 
III Ethics and Politics: The Chalcedonian State 
Liberal individualists are the Nestorians of our politi-
cal tradition, tending to separate ethics and politics 
more than we ought. Proponents of fraternal solidarity 
are the Eutychians of our political tradition, seeking to 
blend politics and ethics more than we can and attempt-
ing a premature resolution of the tension between indi-
vidual and community. What we need, then, is a Chal-
cedonian politics, which will neither separate nor con-
fuse the ethical and the political. 
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In its commitment to individual freedom the liberal 
tradition displays a sound political instinct, but in per-
mitting that commitment to seep into and govern the 
whole of life it corrupts moral virtue. The tradition of 
fraternal community, reversing the error, makes the 
goal of human solidarity a goal to be reached by the 
political community. But there has been and can be a 
form of the liberal tradition which does not attempt to 
overcome the tension between ethics and politics, yet 
does recognize that there is indeed a tension. This form 
of the tradition claims that the public realm-the politi-
cal-exists not just to support and make possible indi-
vidual pursuit of private goals and projects, nor to foster 
fraternal solidarity. Rather, the political realm exists 
to foster private, social bonds-to make space in life for 
families, friendships , clubs, faiths, neighborhoods. 
This vision does not think of individuals simply as 
bundles of interests. They are that, to some degree, of 
course, but they are also capable of forming social ties 
of great importance in human life, ties which can be 
corrupted or destroyed by too much autonomy. Nor 
does this vision contend that we can make no judgments 
about wherein the good life consists. But neither does 
this vision seek fraternal solidarity within political 
community. The goal of fraternity offers an ersatz close-
ness and depends on the notion that intimacy is secured 
by mutual devotion to one common goal. That sort of 
intimacy, however, easily becomes ideological and is 
easily combined with force. 9 By contrast, a genuine 
personal bond like friendship is unlikely to be focused 
on some single common goal and is almost certain to be 
destroyed by force. For this third vision there is no sal-
vation to be gotten from the political-only the possibil-
ity of life within social bonds which, while not them-
selves salvation, may offer intimations of it. Freedom is 
not the way to virtue, nor virtue the road to freedom. 
The concept of virtue which accompanies this under-
standing of individuals in community is not the civic 
virtue of fraternal solidarity; it is the older conception 
of the virtues as individual excellences which fit us for 
the many aspects of life in general. To think of virtues 
in this way-and to think such virtues important for 
human life-is already to commit ourselves to the view 
that political community should do more than foster 
private visions of autonomous individuals; for the de-
velopment of virtuous habits of behavior will always 
require supporting social structures. 10 But there will 
be a diversity of virtues and a variety of lifestyles which 
will rank and develop the virtues in different ways. 
Consider, for example, the difference between foster-
ing civic virtue in the form of fraternal solidarity and 
~Ibid .. p. 245 . 
10 Ibid. . p. 40 . 
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Samuel Johnson once said that "to be happy at home is the end of all human endeavor. " 
That captures nicely the Augustinian vision of the relation of individual and community. 
fostering the private bond of friendship. Friends need 
share no specific aims, are bound by no common goals, 
are ready and willing to receive the newcomer who 
shares their interests-they do not need the outsider to 
define themselves. They care about each other, not 
about the new and transformed self they receive from 
each other. By contrast, even when Walzer recognizes 
the importance of pluralism, he means by this primarily 
the importance of participation in other associations 
that have public aims and goals: labor unions, political 
parties, neighborhood associations. And if his pluralist 
citizen becomes politically unreliable because his loyal-
ties are divided, this is primarily a matter of the citizen's 
personal honor and integrity, those cardinal modern 
virtues. Walzer's individuals are worried about their 
integrity and are seeking a new and better self in public 
life. But they are seldom simply loving and caring about 
others who are connected to them in private, non-goal-
oriented ways. They are seldom individuals who may 
become politically dangerous not out of concern for 
their own integrity but simply because they love other 
people. 
But people like these-the sort we seldom find in 
Walzer's depiction of fraternal community-are the 
citizens political community ought to foster. These will 
be citizens who know the meaning of sacrifice because 
they have, for example, sacrificed for their children. 
They will not simply be interested in making their own 
way in the world. To be sure, of course, they will not 
view political participation as a very great good except 
insofar as it sometimes nourishes their sense of sharing 
a common story with still larger numbers of people-
a common story, not a common goal. Nor are they likely 
to be very warlike unless those bonds which they value, 
bonds both social and private, are threatened. They are, 
that is, likely to be warlike primarily when on the de-
fensive. They will fight for their homeland, not for their 
government. Knowing the family to be a quite different 
sort of community than the state, they are not likely to 
be persuaded that the fourth commandment has much 
to say about honoring political masters. 
Dr. Johnson once said that "to be happy at home is the 
end of all human endeavor." That, I think, captures 
nicely this third vision of the relation of individual and 
community. To be happy at home-that is not a goal 
one can pursue autonomously or privately. But neither 
is it a political goal, though politics may be needed to 
make it possible. What it offers is genuine satisfaction 
of the human spirit, but still a partial satisfaction. For 
to be happy at home, in a genuine if small community 
bound together by love, is both to be happy and to be 
given an intimation of the real meaning of home for 
human beings; for home is that community in which all 
are loved personally by One who has the infinite re-
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sources to love all in that way. And we do not have to be 
possessive individualists to recognize that to try to find 
in any political community such a home is not just to 
fall prey to the "moral and political immaturity" of 
which Isaiah Berlin writes; it is, in the name of a noble 
moral ideal, to let loose in life a political demon. Better 
that we should seek to fashion a political order which 
will reckon with the several senses in which it is true 
that to be happy at home is the end of all human en-
deavor. C: 
A Letter to the General 
Dear General 
who wants to write 
loose and lovely 
prose, 
Do keep honing in 
on those hungries-olives 
and cauliflower 
are not unlike the brain, 
you know. Eat. 
Ask yourself thirty times 
each day what you 
are hungry for: 
write your answers in 
colored pencils. 
Use the ones that break 
and wear down. 
Give yourself a new name. 
Call yourself 
foot soldier. Peel spuds 
all afternoon. 
Wipe your hands on your 
pants. 
Try this: 
stand on your head 
until you collapse-then 
hold a quill pen 
in your teeth. 
Write in saliva. 
Mark out every third word. 




The Theory of Cognitive Development 
Making Sense of College Students 
In a month or two it will be time for college teachers 
to face anew the end-of-the-term student course reviews. 
For some, these teaching evaluations will be gratifying 
and reassuring. For others, they will prove discourag-
ing, even depressing. But for most of us, especially for 
those who fret over a few negative appraisals much more 
than we rejoice over several positive ones, these reviews 
will be naggingly perplexing. 
Repeated perplexity leads either to world-weary 
cynicism or to determined research. I myself felt some-
what cynical when my reviews began to show recurrent 
patterns like the following: 
Review A: Mr. Schwehn seemed to know the material , but he 
seemed heavy handed in running discussions. He did not seem to 
care about students ' opinions. His classroom manner sometimes 
squelched student initiative. 
Review B: Mr. Schwehn seemed to know the material , but he often 
permitted class discussion to ramble. He should lecture more, in-
stead of taking up class time to let students talk . I paid' my tuition 
here at the University of Chicago to hear what experts like Professor 
Schwehn think, not to hear what my fellow students think . 
Well, Schwehn, I said to myself, you cannot please all 
of the students all of the time. Buck up, be yourself, and 
get on with it. When I give myself platitudinous advice 
like this, I know I have decided to stop thinking. 
Unlike me, William G. Perry, Jr. responded to a sim-
ilar quandary in a more constructive fashion. Over a 
period of fifteen years, during the 1950s and 60s, he and 
a team of more than thirty colleagues at Harvard Uni-
versity developed a theory to account for the seemingly 
perverse discrepancies among their student course 
evaluations. That theory, published in 1970 as Forms of 
Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years, 
explained student comments such as the ones quoted 
above as reflections of "coherent interpretive frame-
works through which students give meaning to their 
educational experience:"1 Perry's work has since 
spawned countless research projects designed to test 
Mark R. Schwehn, who formerly taught at the University 
of Chicago, now serves on the faculty of Christ College in 
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"The Reality of E.T.," appeared last May. 
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what quickly became known as the "Perry scheme." In 
this present essay, I shall review some of that research, 
outline some of the pedagogical strategies that it im-
plies, and examine some of its guiding assumptions. 
II 
According to Perry, college students may proceed 
through as many as nine positions or "stages of develop-
ment" in the course of their intellectual life. Each stage 
represents a cognitive structure, a set of assumptions 
that determine how a given student will perceive, or-
ganize, and evaluate experience. The nine stages are 
invariably sequential in that students proceed through 
them one at a time in the same order. They are, more-
over, qualitatively different from one another in that 
the passage from one stage to the next one does not mean 
"adding more of the same" but rather thinking in a new 
way. The stages are finally hierarchical in that each stage 
incorporates the previous stage's rationale before broad-
ening and transforming its assumptions. 
The overwhelming majority of students at all colleges 
fall somewhere between stages I and III. They are lo-
cated in what Perry calls the "dualistic" phase. Dualists 
believe that there are two and only two categories-
right and wrong. They moreover believe in what the 
philosopher Karl Popper once called the "empty bucket" 
theory of knowledge. Such students are self-styled 
empty vessels ready to be filled with truth, i.e., right 
answers. Like the TV detective Joe Friday, the dualist 
wishes the teacher would "just gimme da facts." Stages 
I, II, and III differ only according to how the dualists 
account for uncertainty. In stage I, they refuse to recog-
nize it: all information is either right or wrong. In stage 
II, dualists believe that apparent uncertainty is really 
the result of an error committed by a "wrong" authority. 
In stage III, dualists come to think that some uncertainty 
is genuine, but they believe that it is merely the tem-
porary result of a localized lack of scholarly progress. 
1 Those who wish to pursue some of the ideas presented here might best 
begin with the Perry article from which the above quotation is taken : 
"Cognitive and Ethical Growth : The Making of Meaning," A. W. 
Chickering (ed. ), The Modern American College (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass), 198'1. I have appended a list of additional short and 
readily accessible reference works at the end of this essay . All other 
citations shall be from the articles in this attached bibliography . 
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For multiplists, each opinion is or might be as good as the teacher's. They often subscribe 
to the "one-sophomore-one-vote" theory of literary or historical or sociological interpretation. 
Dualists predictably have great difficulty with cer-
tain academic tasks. They can seldom, if ever, acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of conflicting points of view. They 
believe that class discussion is always a "waste of time." 
They prefer lectures, "objective" tests, and writing as-
signments that ask a question to which there can be only 
one right answer. They love tightly structured class-
room situations . 
Students in stages IV through VI despise tight struc-
tures. They are the multiplists. For them, all opinions 
do matter, and each opinion is or might be as good as the 
teacher's. They therefore often subscribe to the "one-
sophomore-one-vote" theory of literary or historical or 
sociological interpretation. No lectures for them. Lec-
turing is a form of tyranny. Truth occupies a small por-
tion of the larger realm of knowledge, which is char-
acterized by uncertainty. By stage VI, the multiplists 
have become relativists who claim that right-wrong 
dualism is legitimate for some types of inquiry but who 
insist that all truths are finally conditional. Multiplists 
thrive on assignments that dualists cannot comprehend. 
They like to enumerate several conflicting opinions 
or interpretations and to adjudicate among them. 
The need to adopt a reasoned point of view that is 
coherent, consistent, and logically defensible leads some 
students from multiplicity into committed contextual 
relativism (stages VII through IX). Perry admits that 
these last three stages represent positions of psycho-
social rather than cognitive development. Students in 
stages IV through VI often feel lost and afraid in a world 
of uncertainty (all of Perry's stages have affective as 
well as cognitive dimensions), and most multiplists 
seem to remain uncertain, cynical, and uncommitted 
for their entire college career. Some multiplists, how-
ever, "graduate" into commitment, recognizing the need 
to assume reasoned responsibility for their life choices. 
Others unfortunately retreat into dualism with an anti-
intellectual vengeance. 
Perry has applied this scheme with a considerable 
amount of sensitivity and dexterity. He has noted, for 
example, that the scheme is recursive. When any of us 
seeks to enter a new field of learning, we typically begin 
as dualists. "Which books should we read?" we often 
ask authorities whom we trust. We then move through 
a phase when we are overwhelmed with what seem to 
be competing but equally p lausible points of view. And 
we finally emerge with a set of convictions about which 
of the several viewpoints seem most rationally com-
pelling. 
III 
Before turning to the pedagogical implications of 
Perry's scheme, we should bear in mind that the scheme 
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indeed applies as much to teachers as it does to students. 
I suspect that many teachers, having been educated in 
the same system that they serve, remain forever in 
stages IV through VI as multiplists without inner direc-
tion or settled convictions. We might have therefore 
become very proficient at freeing students from the 
tyranny of those unexamined prejudices that hold sway 
over their minds, even th~mgh we have no belief about 
what we are freeing them for. If we are not committed, 
we can hardly expect commitment from our students. 
We should therefore begin reviewing our pedagogy 
by re-viewing ourselves. 
Our students, on the other hand, are almost all dual-
ists in their first year of college. We can best serve them, 
if Perry is correct, by stressing experiential learning, 
by reducing the amount of material we assign, and by 
preparing a range of different intellectual tasks, some 
of which will appeal to dualists and some of which will 
appeal to relativists. We will fail to teach dualists much 
of lasting value if we overload them either with material 
or with diverse points of view. 
These pedagogical injunctions are easier to illustrate 
than they are to describe. Bob Rodgers, a Perry student 
who now teaches at Ohio State University, tells the fol-
lowing story about a colleague of his. Having been con-
vinced by Perry, this history professor revised his 
course syllabus to de-emphasize "coverage" and to 
emphasize the promotion of historical thinking through 
experiential learning. He had, for example, always 
taught the New Deal portion of his American History 
survey course through lectures about social and politi-
cal change during the 1930s. Under Perry's influence, 
he discarded his lecture notes and prepared instead two 
sets of slides. One set, shown to the accompaniment of 
the tune "Brother Can You Spare a Dime?", showed 
pictures of soup kitchens, shanty towns, bread lines, and 
dust bowl farms. The other set, shown to the accompani-
ment of "On the Sunny Side of the Street," showed pic-
tures of luxury cars, lavish dinner parties, seaside frol-
ics, and great sports festivals. The students all agreed 
that the first set of slides portrayed the 1930s whereas 
the second set portrayed the 1940s. Both sets, of course, 
showed 1930s scenes, and both were accompanied by 
music composed during that era. 
Needless to say, this presentation both confounded 
and motivated the dualists. They wanted to know which 
was the "right" view of the depression, but each "view" 
contained its own supporting evidence. The class quick-
ly began to discuss the nature of historical evidence, the 
ways in which historians appraise conflicting evidence, 
and the discipline required in order to formulate a 
comprehensive interpretation. Notice that this professor 
did not overwhelm the students with abstract conflicting 
interpretations. He simply omitted his finely polished 
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Dualists w ill wait for the professor to give them t he " right" account (even if the "right" account is 
that there is no completely "right" account) and they will dutifully memorize it for the final exam. 
lecture on the six accounts of the economic causes of 
the depression. Dualists can be moved to wrestle with 
two competing accounts or theories , t/ these are pre-
sented concretely. They will pay little attention to six 
accounts of anything. They will instead wait for the 
professor to give them the "right" account (even if the 
"right" account is that there is no completely "right" 
account), and they will dutifully memorize it for the 
final exam. 
Notice also that this professor managed to do some-
thing very unusual. He abandoned the coverage model 
of introductory course organization. As a result, his 
students will know nothing about the FDIC. Nor will 
they be able to place the CCC, WPA, TVA, NRA, Wag-
ner Act, and Social Security Act in the first or second 
New Deal. Instead, they will have been moved to think 
historically and to be suspicious of unbalanced accounts 
of anything. And they may have been moved to study 
about the depression on their own, if for no other reason 
than to resolve the conundrum that they saw in class. 
Indeed, the deadliest enemy of college learning is 
the professorial obsession with coverage. If we were to 
teach a youngster to juggle, we would not ask him or her 
to begin with six oranges. Two, at most three, would be 
fine for a long while. But when we teach poetry, we often 
assign six George Herbert poems on Monday, six John 
Donne poems on Wednesday, and six Andrew Marvell 
poems on Friday (we've simply got to get to the eigh-
teenth century by the eighth week of the term). Give 
the would-be juggler too many oranges and he or she 
quickly decides that juggling is impossible and not 
much fun. The same applies to texts and scientific ex-
periments. Unless feelings of genuine competence and 
understanding begin to flourish, there will be no pleas-
ure and not much learning. Perry's work provides one 
more support for this truth. 
IV 
When I first read Perry's work, I had the uneasy feel-
ing that I had somehow already encountered all of his 
ideas. I eventually realized that I indeed had known 
about the alleged movement from dualism to multi-
plicity to committed contextual relativism, but my 
knowledge had come from sources altogether different 
from social science research. The first such source was 
my own experience as a student: I myself had gone 
through stages very much like the ones that Perry de-
scribes. The second source was a literary masterpiece, 
Henry Adams' The Education of Henry Adams, a book 
written at the turn of the twentieth century by a scholar 
who had been present at the beginnings of the modern 
university. 2 
Long before Perry and his co-workers discovered 
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patterns of cognitive development at Harvard, Adams, 
himself a Harvard student and a Harvard professor, 
had begun to experience life as "a double thing." His Ed-
ucation begins with a series of unforgettable dualisms-
Boston and Quincy, winter and summer, discipline and 
freedom, error and truth. In the course of his quest for 
some master generalization that would "finish h is 
clamor to be educated," Adams repeatedly failed, until 
he adopted a position much like the one that Perry de-
scribes as "multiplicity." Finally, Adams devised a 
"formula of his own," arguing, again as Perry later 
would, that meaning is something that we make, not 
something that we find. 
Unlike Perry, however, Adams realized that he was 
very much-perhaps too much-a creature of his own 
time and place. He had come of age during the nine-
teenth century when developmental models were 
everywhere in fashion. He furthermore understood 
the safe and self-congratulatory overtones of Comtean 
or Darwinian conceptions of "progress" regardless of 
whether such conceptions were applied to the human 
mind, as they were by Herbert Spencer, or to nations 
and cultures, as they were by E. B. Tylor. Adams accord-
ingly arranged his Education to challenge the prevailing 
smug faith in developmentalisms of all sorts. He inter-
preted his life not as a smooth linear progression 
through stages but rather as a series of convulsive dis-
continuities. He also insisted that his world was devolv-
ing more than it was evolving, and he severely ques-
tioned much of what we proudly celebrate as the 
achievements of "developed" nations. 
Adams' Education therefore displays movement and 
change but not some idealized and ahistorical model of 
progress. He had modelled his Education in part on the 
great spiritual autobiography of St. Augustine. And he 
was quick to observe that whereas he had been forced to 
work from unity to multiplicity, Augustine in the Con-
fessions had worked from multiplicity to unity. Adams 
was, moreover, very careful to state those conditions of 
the modern West that had made his journey so different 
from Augustine's: technological change, the increased 
velocity of history, the rise of modern science, and the 
"stupendous failure of Christianity." 
Though we may disagree with Adams about the form-
ative conditions of our world, we should imitate h im in 
one respect when we reflect upon the significance of the 
work of Perry, his followers, and his critics. We should 
first try to see Perry's research for the kind of work it 
really is, and we should then bring to bear upon it the 
same kind of cultural and historical perspective that 
2 Perry attached a bibliography to the article I cited earlier. The first 
entry in that bibliography is , curiously enough , Adams' Education, 
even though Perry neither cites nor alludes to Adams in the course of 
his argument. 
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The "Perry scheme" promises to lead us to the paradise of committed contextual relativism. 
But we might at least want to consider other conceptions of the desired goals of education. 
Adams brought to bear upon his own education. We 
need, in other words, more cultural criticism and less 
of the kind of social-scientific criticism we have come to 
expect in response to research like Perry's-fine tun-
ings of testing instruments, empirical demonstrations 
that the Perry scheme does not work so well for women 
at Wellesley as it does for men at Harvard, and a pro-
fusion of comparative studies that show us the per-
centage of dualists and contextual relativists at different 
schools and at different stages of the four-year B.A. 
program. 
Perry's work is really the modern, secular equivalent 
of a medieval manual of spiritual discipline. It stands 
in relation to Adams' Education in much the same way 
that the manuals of religious orders once stood in rela-
tion to a single, great spiritual autobiography. Perry's 
research marks out the nine stages of the soul 's move-
ment from ignorance to truth, informs the modern secu-
lar priesthood (college teachers) of those disciplines 
best designed to foster such a movement, and promises 
that, if followed carefully, this scheme will lead us all to 
the paradise of committed contextual relativism. On 
this reading, the "Perry scheme" tells us nothing about 
the growth of the human mind (whatever that term might 
mean apart from culture). Instead, it tells us a great deal 
about the process of acculturation we have devised in 
America over the course of the last century. 
The ultimate tribute to the power of Adams' Education 
is that Perry and others have now come to think (mis-
takenly) that all minds either must or should (the dis-
tinction is seldom made clearly) develop in the same 
way that Adams' did. Adams, on the other hand , would 
have agreed, I think, with Ivan Illich who once de-
scribed American education as a vast ritual in service 
to the myth of progress. And he would have agreed too 
that this conception of education is itself an aberration 
in the context of the larger movement of Western his-
tory . His Education, Adams always insisted, was more 
about his times than it was about his life. 
Only when we appreciate, as Adams would have, the 
limitations of Perry's work can we learn from it. We can 
learn what is so often behind the puzzling course evalu-
ations we receive. We can learn why our students have 
such great difficulty completing some of our assign-
ments. And we can learn to vary our pedagogy to pro-
mote learning in our classrooms. We should also learn, 
however, to raise more fundamental questions and to 
keep such questions always before us. Do we really think 
that our respective colleges will have succeeded if they 
nurture generations of committed contextual relativists? 
Make no mistake. The movement that Perry describes 
and documents is a fact of contemporary cultural life. 
But do we wish to continue to make it a fact? Or is there 
some other conception of the desired goals of education 
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that we might seek to promote through our teaching, 
our example, and our curricular planning? 
Even to ask questions such as these is to take Perry's 
work for what it is rather than for what it sometimes 
pretends to be. We can resist culture; we cannot so easily 
resist nature. We need not, in other words, accept the 
"Perry scheme" as an immutable law of human cognitive 
development. We may take it as a fine account of certain 
cultural facts. If we approve of these facts, we can act in 
concert with them to insure their continued presence in 
our midst. But if we have doubts, we are equally free to 
change the process that we ourselves have, over the 
course of this past century, created. ~~ 
Reference Works 
Clinchy, B. and Zimmerman, C. "Epistemology and 
Agency in the Development of Undergraduate Women." 
In P. Perun (ed.), The Undergraduate Woman: Issues in 
Educational Equity. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 1981. 
Knefelkamp, L. and Slepitza, R. "A Cognitive De-
velopmental Model of Career Development: An Adap-
tation of the Perry Scheme," The Counseling Psychologist, 
1976, 6(3) , pp. 53-58. 
Kurfiss, J. "Intellectual, Psychological, and Moral 
Development in College: Four Major Theories." In the 
Manual for Project QUE (Quality Under-Graduate 
Education), Council for Independent Colleges, One 
Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C. 20036 
Perry, William. "Cognitive and Ethical Growth: The 
Making of Meaning." In A. W. Chickering (ed.), The 
Modern American College. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
1981. 
Perry, William. Forms of Intellectual and Etht"cal De-
velopment in the College Years. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1970. 
Rodgers, R. F. "Theories Underlying Student De-
velopment." In D. G. Creamer (ed.), Student Develop-
ment in Higher Education. Cincinnati: American College 
Personnel Association Press, 1980. 
Widick, C., Knefelkamp, L. and Parker, C. "The 
Counselor as a Developmental Instructor," Counselor 
Education and Supervision, 1975, 14, pp. 286-296. 
Widick, C. and Simpson, D. "Developmental Con-
cepts in College Instruction." In C. A. Parker (ed.), 
Encouraging Development in College Students. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978. 
The Cresset 
"There is nothing to express, no power to express, nothing with which to express, no 
desire to express, nothing worth expressing, together with the obligation to express. " 
Beyond Godot, Beyond Commitment 
Samuel Beckett was five years away from being an 
octogenarian in 1981 when Mal vu mal dit was published . 
His advanced age notwithstanding, he continues to 
write with the same overt enthusiasm and rapidity evi-
dent in his youth: this in spite of his known reservations 
concerning language as a means of communication. The 
active septuagenarian had declared in his younger 
days: "There is nothing to express, no power to express, 
nothing with which to express, no desire to express, 
nothing worth expressing, together with the obligation 
to express."1 Such remarks, however oblique, make 
good copy and excite reader interest. 
Actually the Nobel laureate has a devout and increas-
ing audience now, which may explain why there is no 
abating of his pen. Titles come out at the rate of one a 
year, or at least one every two years. Compagnie, pub-
lished early in 1980, was thought by many of Beckett's 
followers to be his last expression; but late in 1981 Mal vu 
mal dit came out, to the delight of the public, especially 
the youthful public abroad now rediscovering Beckett, 
the apostle of nothingness, of emptiness, and of an ever-
deepening physical and psychological black hole. Faced 
with the crumbling authority of established institutions, 
both religious and lay, with values declared invalid and 
not yet replaced by others, with vagueness, uncertainty, 
and with nebulous ideals, the French youth of high 
school and university age appears more and more to 
devour the night-sea journey of Beckett, from his earlier 
Murphy and Malone Dies to the very latest titles. It is 
important, then, to review Mal vu mal dit in order to try 
and isolate the attraction it has for the older Beckettian 
aficionados as well as for the younger reader for whom 
the author exercises a special appeal. 
Nothing new in content or form at first glance, not 
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Samuel Beckett's Solitude 
Alfred Cismaru 
even at second. A solitary character again, a woman this 
time, mostly seated in her decrepit chair, sometimes 
standing, or walking, or hovering, white hair and blue 
skin, feebly enunciating the storiless story of her life. 
In her case, however, existence may be a better term 
than life, marginal existence at that, somewhere be-
tween appearance and reality, at the frontier of being, 
containing a glimmer of presence and a remote, cryptic 
past. Her story is that of her progressive putrescence: 
from the earliest recalled moments to the later, clearly 
perceived time of malady and malediction, limitation 
and lameness, decay and despair. 
Blackness and Bleakness as Penumbra 
She remains indoors during the day, behind the black 
door of her hut, the black curtain of the sole window, 
amidst the black shadows thrown by her black garb and 
seen by her deeply black eyes. Sometimes, though, at 
night, she exits, and then blackness and bleakness be-
come penumbra. Down in the sky is the planet Venus, 
remote but radiant in the outer world, in the other 
world, where things might be different, or the same, 
who knows. She likes especially to get out and walk 
when it is winter and she can be even more aware of her 
black shadow on the white snow, for it is that shadow 
that gives her shape, with its black on white irrefutable 
proof, persuading her that she still is. And in order not 
to lose that persuasion, during her walks she changes 
direction now and then, the shadow following, plausible 
and reassuring. 
But in time monotony breaks down man and nature. 
In time, bored, she exits with less frequency , forgets that 
there is something outside her hut, forgets to walk. Her 
inner domain encircles her and eclipses the outside 
until she becomes at one with the abject objects around 
1 In the first of "Three Dialogues" by Samuel Beckett and Georges 
Duthuit, from Transition Forty-Nine. No. 5 (Pari s: copyright by 
Samuel Beckett and Georges Duthui t. 1949). pp. 17- 18. 
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Beckett's characters, though debilitated and crippled, though always at the edge of existence and 
in danger of physical and spiritual disappearance, nevertheless remain profoundly individualistic. 
her, solid as they are, inert and petrified, stone among 
other stones, matte, meaningless matter. Yet even 
though she has taken on the countenance of an opaque 
and concave rock, she oscillates and questions, unde-
cided about the worthiness of the effort, yet intrigued 
somewhere in the nucleus of her almost-being. There 
is oscillation in such statements as: "The night is empty? 
Nothing."2 There is question in one of the last moments 
when she wonders: "Is this the time to aspire this void? 
To know happiness?"3 In Mal vu mal dit there is a time-
space continuum, it seems, and the black hole may yet 
be a beginning. It is then that tears erupt and flow down 
the heroine's wrinkled face, forming puddles within 
the wrinkles, as rain does within deep depressions. The 
tears remain there a while, until they too evaporate and 
evanesce, leaving the skin even drier than before, and 
the soul even more arid. 
All this Beckett narrates in mysterious sequences of 
opalescent images replete with metaphors, metonymies, 
and synecdoches. Poet that he is, he liberally uses as-
sonances, alliterations, and rhymes, making word the 
Word, only to cause it to weaken later, to erode and 
finally to disappear in an avalanche of limiting and 
contradictory statements. Moreover, in alchemistic 
fashion, he transforms the words and the objects, feel-
ings, and ideas they represent into other words desig-
nating other objects, opposing feelings, and contra-
dictory ideas, until heroine and reader are no longer 
able to pinpoint reality and everything is reduced to 
naught or nought. 
The solid becomes liquid, the concrete dissolves into 
the amorphous, the crutch of the immobile is pushed 
from right under one's arm into frightening mobility, 
and always vortices spin at dizzying speeds, decompos-
ing anything that might be glued together, however 
strongly, however fleetingly. Oblivion takes over then, 
but not that total kind which allows one to rest at last, 
or to recuperate at least. It is rather a cruel forgetful-
ness into which memories creep back, haunting, making 
one hope in some kind of collage, but insufficient for it, 
sufficient only to augment further the frustration and 
despair. An arcanum is always in sight and always 
beyond reach. 
Banal contents in all these almost-goings-on in Mal 
vu mal dit, and a form that one has come to expect of 
Beckett, albeit it always more polished, always more 
esthetically pleasing. Whence, then, the continued inter-
est of his older readers and the rather unexpected cu-
riosity of the younger generations? 
The first part of the question has an easier answer 
2 Samuel Beckett. Mal vu mal dit (Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1981 ). 
p. 17 ; all translations from French are mine. 
3 Jbid. . p. 75 . 
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than the second. Beckett's appeal to the post-World War 
II public resides in the aloofness that he preaches to 
readers forced by circumstances into the nauseating 
togetherness of the ghettos, of the concentration camps, 
and of armies held compact by the fear of death on the 
battlefield. In wartime the individual is diminished and 
the State is aggrandized. Likewise, commitment is held 
high in the name of Patriotism, in the name of love of 
one's fellow man, or in the name of hate of one's fellow 
man-enemy. During World War II, of course, Beckett 
had refused to take sides, just as he refused later to opt 
for one position or another in the cold war or in the 
other altercations that took place in France, or between 
France and other nations, or between America and the 
Soviet Union. His has always been an attitude of haugh-
tiness that many secretly wished they had. 
Loners Cultivating Loneliness 
Like Beckett, his characters, though debilitated and 
crippled, though always at the edge of existence and in 
danger of physical and spiritual disappearance, never-
theless remain profoundly individualistic. Loners, they 
cultivate loneliness, and in spite of sporadic complaints, 
they could not exist otherwise, they would not know 
how. Murphy, Malone, Molloy, Krapp, Ping, to name 
some of the named ones, as well as the score of anony-
mous narrators and talking consciences in his corpus, 
are neither indebted to anyone, nor can anyone add to 
their existence. Perhaps they are self-sufficient because 
they barely suffice; yet, for the most part, their inde-
pendence and their need of solitude are assets worth 
having, assets which proved admirable to a generatiop 
that had for too long known only the humiliation of 
dependence, of forced assembly and of forced collec-
tivities. 
Commitment, that Sartrean illusory road to happi-
ness, is unacceptable to Beckett. Given the mortality of 
man and the further reduction of his availability caused 
by disease and other ills beyond his control, any en-
gagement undertaken can only be temporary, can only 
mask the absurdity of existence without in fact dimin-
ishing its senselessness. Passivity, on the contrary, 
appears more logical, if not more consoling. Consola-
tion, however, is not cathartic for the lucid and the 
strong. Consolation requires acceptance, compromise; 
it means giving up even that meager possession of one's 
shadow for another's which, once adopted, is neither 
one's own, nor someone else's. Only the weak opt for 
such an arrangement, losers like those waiting for Godot 
and interpreting the latter to be some kind of savior. 
When asked what he had meant by the name in the title 
of his celebrated play, Beckett's answer was brutally to 
The Cresset 
"And now the fable too . The fable of one with you in the dark. The fable of one fabling with you 
in the dark. And how better in the end labor lost and silence. And you as you always were. Alone. " 
the point: "We have no elucidations to offer of mys-
teries that are all of their [the critics'] making. My work 
is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended) 
made as fully as possible, and I accept responsibility 
for nothing else. If people want to have headaches 
among the overtones, let them. And provide their own 
aspirins."4 
Commitment, like Godot, is mere aspirin. It takes 
care, and not always, of a symptom. It does not attack or 
eliminate a fundamental wrong. For Beckett, it is the 
simple panacea of the believer, whether he be the theist 
priest who dispenses pills and palliatives of dubious 
value, or the atheist existentialist who points to engage-
ment as the pie in the sky salutory agent. Sartre and his 
followers, like all those who preach, propose, and im-
pose, are believers. Theists, atheists, and even anti-
theists (such as Jean Genet, for example) are all believers 
for they accept the others (only temporarily can they 
affirm that hell is the others). Some go so far as accept-
ing the Other, and all would efface everyone for the 
sake of some mere manna. Beckett despises them all be-
cause in the process of directing the abasement of the 
individual and the aggrandizement of a collective being, 
or of a divine Being, they place their own entity on the 
pedestal of a prophet. From their height they pledge, 
promise, proclaim, promulgate, and above all procreate 
the myth of immortality, of freedom from disease, of 
happiness. All prophets are false prophets, Beckett 
appears to think, and it is time to bare the awful truth 
of utter loneliness and quasi-absolute nihilism. 
In the preceding title, Compagnie, such baring had 
already been done. There, the pen, worn-out, could no 
longer write any more names. There was no one begin-
ning with M anymore, no Pozzo or Ham, no Auditor or 
Winnie, nor even any Krapp. Only once there was an 
I , the mind, which was otherwise only referred to as He, 
trapped in He as it contemplated its own futilely com-
plex machinery. Nor could the pen still write such 
words as underground, or trash can, or m olehill, or prison 
cell, or womb, or grave, which would have made for one 
of Beckett's known cosmographies. 
On the contrary, there was no locus, for the mind was 
everywhere. And nowhere. Into it memories came and 
went, unwieldy, mainly something about a birth the 
day Jesus died, something about the gravitational pull 
of the planet, about two lovers in a summer cottage, eyes 
closed, trying to feel love, or to make love, or to pretend 
the feelings of love and make the gestures of love. But 
what a trick it is, in Beckett's scheme, to owe one's life 
to someone's death, how utterly humiliating and ulti-
mately confining. One can never escape the debt, nor 
4 Samuel Beckett, letter to Max Schneider in Village Voice (March 
1958), 2. 
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direct one's love to someone else. Dependence on Godot 
is like dependence on the State, and both He and it are 
givers. Life as gift is not worth much, Beckett points out. 
The gift always magnifies the giver and belittles the 
recipient. Non-existence, or marginal existence, are 
better than received existence, and ours being given, it 
is best to be aware of its invalidity and frailty. 
And so Compagnie had ended with the extinguishing 
of. whatever light, dim light, the mind may have sal-
vaged from its introversion. Beckett finally admonished 
the reader: "Quick, leave him [the narrator-mind]'5 and 
there was no other choice for we were back in the darkest 
dark, waiting inside a fable: "Till finally you hear how 
words are coming to an end. With every inane word a 
little closer to the last. And now the fable too. The fable 
of one with you in the dark. The fable of one fabling 
with you in the dark. And how better in the end labor 
lost and silence. And you as you always were. Alone. "6 
Preferring Solitude to Company 
Mal vu mal dit, like Compagnie, is a lesson in independ-
ence. It reaffirms the primacy of the individual, the 
worthiness of lucidity, even of loneliness. And if the 
net result for the individual is not much different from 
the plight of the believer who casts his lot with Godot, 
with an ism, or with a collectivity, at least it affords the 
loner that important feeling of dignity which goes with 
personal effort and with a demise unwitnessed by others, 
an effacement neither p leasing to, nor hurting, anyone 
else. Neither the ghetto, nor the concentration camp, 
nor any freely organized communal society can provide 
that needed privacy that humiliation, suffering, and 
agony require . Men are asocial animals, Beckett's good 
friend , Eugene Ionesco, has had occasion to observe. 
Unlike ants and bees, they prefer solitude to company 
(Ionesco pointed out that, in the French subway, the 
single seats are almost always occupied and many pas-
sengers prefer to stand rather than occupy a place next 
to someone else on a bench for two)/ and extroversion 
and sociability are forced upon them. 
The continued relevance of Beckett's message for the 
postoWorld War II generation of readers, understood 
as outlined above, helps to explain also the remarkable 
fascination that younger adults appear to have for the 
words of the Nobel Prize winner. Granted that those 
now in their twenties and thirties have experienced war, 
concentration camps, and ghettos to a much lesser de-
5 Samuel Beckett, Compagnie (Pari s: Editions de Minuit , 1980 ), p. 82 . 
6 /bid. , p. 83. 
7 Eugene lonesco, Notes et contre-notes (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 
p. 201. 
17 
New sources of malaise have emerged, more 
terrifying than those of past generations. 
gree, it remains true nevertheless that major and minor 
conflicts have occurred around them continually since 
1945. 
In addition, new sources of malaise have emerged, 
more terrifying than those that had beset their older 
peers: the possibility of atomic disasters and atomic war-
fare, for example. Terrorism, everywhere, is now prac-
ticed in the name of religion, of love, of charity, of 
righteous indignation. Since World War II isms seem to 
have lost a tangible aura: they come and go, yet the 
masses, dehumanized (because organized), demonstrate 
for or against an ism only to find themselves later in a 
position they had attacked just recently. A Godot of 
some kind or another lurks everywhere, menacing those 
who would oppose him or ignore him . And the young, 
recruited , like the rhinos Ionesco had deplored once, 
respond to demagoguery with demonstrations, very 
often with sacrifice. 
Ideologies Coming Apart in Time 
But remarkably dense ideas and richly textured ideol-
ogies come apart in time, in brief time, losing their 
woven quality. The young, more apt to rebel, cannot 
fail to realize sooner or later that revolt never solves 
anything. In fact, throughout history, a despot is always 
removed by a liberator who all too soon becomes a des-
pot himself. The Castros of today take over from the 
Batistas of yesterday only to emulate the tyrant and en-
hance the tyranny replaced. Communion neither with 
the dictator of the present nor with the savior-dictator 
of the future appears, . then, as the better alternative. 
Albert Camus, back in 1957, published a little-known 
short story entitled Jonas. Jonas is a painter of genius 
who has a wife, children, disciples . He is sought, inter-
viewed, admired. Unable to retain his individuality 
because of the others, he decides to take refuge in the 
attic of his home. He opts for the dignity of seclusion 
and, before dying, he signs his last painting not with his 
name but with the word Solidaire. Only the d in the sig-
nature looks like a I, it may be a t in fact, and the ques-
tion concerning the value of being solitary or solidary 
is asked but is never quite answered. 
Unlike Camus, Beckett does give the answer, and 
without the slightest hesitation : the solitude he culti-
vates for himself and that into which he plunges his 
characters provide examples by which a trace of indis-
pensable individuality is restored to men otherwise 
stripped by isms and Godots of their rightful self. Little 
does it matter that this course is not any more curative 
of physical and spiritual ills, nor of mortality; it is dif-
ferent at least, and probably superior to the trauma of 
forced togetherness and stifling sociability. Cl 
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Halloween 
Bright October trees, 
my hair 
and your leaves 
are falling. 
My daughter squeezes 
too much curly hair 
beneath her 




and with her sack 
goes out to gather 
candy from the neighbors. 
She never hears 
the cries arise 
from sidewalk cracks 
and never feels your leaves 
beneath her feet 
and never hears my sighs 
as she skips 
amid the dead 
and dying, 
bright October trees. 
Eating an Apple 
This apple opens up my fist 
to nearly palm, 
and snuggles there, 
warm sop of sun, 




from a clump of roots 
and earth. 
Eve, Athena, Helen, 
shimmer still within her shiny face . 
I rip out the stem 
that sinks within her heart, 
and dust off the traces 
of hovering mythologies. 
The past erased, 
I begin again today, 
and sink my teeth 
deep in this 
inviting flesh. 






Drama and Significance 
Albert R. Trost 
The tragic downing of the Korean 
Airlines 747 by the Soviet Union will 
have little direct effect on the course 
of international relations in the 
1980s. It merely reinforces the deep 
suspicion about Russian intentions 
already held by the Reagan Admin-
istration. Rhetoric certainly heated 
up for several weeks between Wash-
ington and Moscow (and in the 
United Nations), but it is not likely 
to lead to any significant alteration 
in Soviet-American diplomatic and 
military relations. 
At the height of public reaction 
to the disaster, Secretary of State 
George Schultz flew to Madrid as he 
had been planning for the final ses-
sion of the current round of the 
thirty-five-nation European Secur-
ity Conference. Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet 
Union also attended as he had 
planned to do for weeks, and a meet-
ing between Schultz and Gromyko 
took place as previously scheduled. 
Admittedly, their agenda was al-
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The Soviet downing of the Korean airliner will have 
little direct effect on international relations. 
tered by the circumstances, and both 
sides leveled stronger-than-usual re-
criminations. 
Similarly, arms control talks be-
tween the United States and the 
Soviet Union resumed on schedule 
in Geneva scarcely a week after the 
Russian attack on the airliner. The 
prospects for an arms control agree-
ment this coming year were probably 
never good. They haven 't improved 
after the incident, but neither can it 
be said that they have worsened. 
Very few observers think that the 
chances of a general war have in-
creased. 
The significance of the shocking 
event is more indirect. It consumes 
the time of political elites and 
crowds the political agenda. Some 
of the things crowded out are missed 
by very few. For instance, how much 
news did we hear during the first 
weeks of September about the race 
for the Democratic nomination for 
President? George McGovern at-
tracted a little attention with his be-
lated and unexpected entry into the 
field, but little was heard from the 
other candidates. However, not all 
of the events and issues that were 
pushed aside deserved that fate. On 
the contrary, the world's quest for 
peace with justice was greatly com-
promised by not giving them great-
er attention and resources. Two 
issues in particular that needed 
fuller exposure than they got be-
cause of the attention given to the 
airplane tragedy were the renewed 
hostilities in Lebanon and the per-
sistent problem of third-world debt. 
Of course, it is precisely the dra-
matic crisis conditions surrounding 
the loss of the airliner that attract 
attention. The media and the public 
are fascinated by the mystery, the 
constantly unfolding facts and reve-
lations, and the seeming simplicity 
of cause and blame, good and evil. 
As my colleague James Combs would 
observe, it plays like a soap opera. 
Public leaders are attracted to the 
issue by the media attention it draws 
and by its potential for developing 
a national consensus, in contrast to 
the divisive partisan conflict in-
herent in most other issues. The re-
sult is that even serious platforms 
for public inquiry and debate, like 
the New York Times and public tele-
vision, become preoccupied by the 
CrlSIS. 
The Middle East and the third-
world debts are problems that, un-
like the airliner tragedy, are per-
sistent, complex, and seemingly un-
solvable. Unfortunately, these two 
problems are also the ones closest to 
threatening not only the basic se-
curity of the United States but also 
the peace and stability of the world. 
They should be at the center of our 
attention. 
In the week that the Korean plane 
was shot down, American Marines 
suffered casualties m Lebanon. 
While there are good reasons for the 
presence of the Marines in Lebanon, 
the death of four of them should 
prompt a careful look at our commit-
ment in that region. The presence 
of fifty-five advisers in El Salvador 
with one death so far has prompted 
several Congressional investigations 
and visits to the area, heated public 
demonstrations, and numerous edi-
torials. There are over a thousand 
American troops in Lebanon with a 
great potential for more casualties. 
Moreover, those troops operate in 
close proximity to Russian advisers 
(with Syrian troops) with the attend-
ant risk of a wider conflict, if not bi-
polar confrontation, and little 
chance for the kind of political 
movement in the crisis that would 
permit withdrawal. Congress has 
moved to give Lebanon deserved 
attention through the vehicle of a 
debate on the application of the War 
Powers Act to the conflict. But it is 
doubtful that public and media in-
terest in Lebanon can be sustained 
to support the interest shown by 
Congress. Even without having its 
attention diverted by spectacular 
crises , the public finds it difficult to 
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One can see the current American involvement in Central America as a repeat of 
Vietnam, a case of American imperialism, or a chance to turn back the Red tide. 
focus on the Lebanese situation. 
From the public's standpoint, the 
problem with Lebanon is that the 
issue is too complex and has been 
around for too long. Our commit-
ment in Central America seems eas-
ier to understand and, hence, de-
bate. Depending on one's political 
position, all sorts of facile handles 
exist to understand Central Amer-
ica. One can see it as a repeat of 
Vietnam, a case of American im-
perialism, or a chance to turn back 
the Red tide. Cause and effect and 
good and evil seem far easier to 
apply in the case of the airliner and 
in Central America. 
There are few easy handles to 
apply in the current Middle Eastern 
crisis . The one that has historically 
been available, support for Israel, 
does not fit as easily in the present 
circumstance. Israel has withdrawn 
from Lebanon. In fact, it is that very 
withdrawal that has required more 
American commitment. In addition, 
the moral position of the Israelis 
and their allies, the Lebanese Chris-
tians, has been compromised by the 
massacre at the Palestinian camps 
over a year ago. 
There are several distinct factions 
or parties to the conflict in Lebanon. 
The basic division between Chris-
tian and Moslem is complicated by 
further divisions within these 
groups. Because of these competing 
factions it is difficult to say what or 
who Lebanon is. The existing 
government itself reflects the basic 
divisions of the country. Even this 
divided government has effective 
authority in only a small part of 
Lebanon. To complicate the picture 
even more, there are at least seven 
foreign armies in the country in 
addition to a small United Nations 
force. Besides the American forces, 
the British, Italians, French, Pal-
estinians, Syrians, and Israelis also 
maintain troops there. A small Iran-
ian contingent is present as well, 
and we have already noted the Rus-
sian advisers with the Syrians. In 
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addition, the Libyans are threaten-
ing to go in. 
There has been a high incidence 
of violence and turmoil in Lebanon 
since the civil war in 1975. As with 
Northern Ireland, this is much too 
long a time to sustain the attention 
of the media and the public. It is 
only the presence of the American 
troops that keeps the story near the 
front page. 
American troop commitment 
quite aside, Lebanon is today one 
of the three or four major threats to 
world peace. The involvement of the 
sworn enemies, Israel and Syria, 
both now occupying large sections 
of the country, is the primary de-
stabilizing factor. The Russian and 
American involvement complicates 
the situation. Overlaying these out-
side influences are the self-perpet-
uating hatreds of Lebanese factions 
for one another, and the highly-
charged and frustrated struggle of 
the Palestinian people for a home-
land. This requires our undivided 
attention. 
Even Jess dramatic, but just as 
threatening to peace and stability, 
is the debt owed by third-world na-
tions to Western banks, govern-
ments, and international organiza-
tions. The debt totals between $700 
billion and $900 billion. Much of it 
is short-term, and most of it is owed 
by eight nations. All of these nations 
have been unable to meet their pay-
ment schedules on these loans over 
the last several years and have had 
to do additional borrowing and to 
reschedule their payments. The 
news of these rescheduling meetings 
and new loans is an almost daily 
occurrence, but it is relegated to the 
financial pages of a few high-quality 
newspapers. It rarely makes the tele-
vision network news shows. Yet the 
debt is life-threatening not only to 
several dozen third-world nations 
but to the whole international eco-
nomic system. 
Two events in particular asso-
ciated with this debt crisis surfaced 
in the weeks surrounding the shoot-
ing-down of the airliner. They prob-
ably escaped most of the public's 
view entirely, even though they 
could have thrown our lives into 
greater disruption than any of the 
issues that did get attention. First, 
the Latin American nations held a 
meeting with their creditors. There 
is substantial domestic pressure in 
these nations to repudiate their 
debts unilaterally, especially in 
Brazil which owes the most, $90 bil-
lion. With some critical compromises 
by creditors and debtors alike, the 
immediate cns1s passed. There 
should have been more witnesses to 
the narrowness of the margin by 
which disaster was averted. The 
second event involves Congress di-
rectly, so at least there are more 
participants in finding a solution. 
The International Monetary Fund, 
a principal creditor and guarantor 
of the third-world debt, requires 
more capital. The United States 
pledged $8 billion, or about 20 per 
cent of the required amount. How-
ever, the approval of Congress is 
required. Not only is passage far 
from certain at this time, but Con-
gress' debate on the issue has dealt 
little with the substantive issues. 
Congress has focused instead on a 
tangential issue, whether any of the 
aid shall go to Communist nations. 
The critical nature of the Congres-
sional decision is likely to escape 
notice. 
Under the best of conditions, we 
could not expect the necessary media 
or public attention to either Leban-
on or the third-world debt problem. 
When an event occurs with the dra-
matic outlines of the shooting-down 
of a commercial airliner with 269 
people aboard, by a power with the 
reputation of the Soviet Union, any 
sense of priority and importance is 
lost. About all that can be said is that 
the downing of the airliner was very 
well covered, which offers testimony 
to the potential of the media for 





My favorite movie of the last 
couple of years is not The Road War-
rior. Nonetheless it's high on the 
list: crowding Tootsie and La Tra-
viata at the top; edging out small 
attractive films like Diner and Local 
Hero; easily besting anything in its 
own category of action film. I hesi-
tate to write about The Road Warrior 
for one reason only. Every time I 
see it, I feel like Marinetti, the 
abominable Italian futurist, expostu-
lating on the beauties of warfare. 
The Road Warrior celebrates fighting. 
One could sense the unease in many 
favorable notices of the film, and 
even more in Pauline Kael 's strained 
put-down (The New Yorker, Septem-
ber 6, 1982). Kael, she who had sung 
the glories of The Warriors, turned 
from The Road Warrior in faint dis-
gust. The movie was pretentious. 
The director, unfortunate auto-
didact, had perused the works of 
Jung and Joseph Campbell. The re-
sult was a "sappy" and "sentimental" 
work. Thus argued Kael, but she 
must have seen another movie. No 
Richard Maxwell teaches in the De-
partment of English at Valparaiso Uni-
versity and offers a course in Film 
Aesthetics. 
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The Road Warrior is an excellent film, even 
if its subject is the beauties of warfare. 
one since Homer has done fights so 
well and given us so much reason to 
wonder at them. 
Homer? The Iliad? Has your re-
viewer gone mad? To find out, let 
us start at the beginning. Before The 
Road Warrior George Miller made 
Mad Max, a movie which is indeed 
sappy and sentimental. Place: Aus-
tralia, presumably. Time: the near 
future. Motorcycle gangs roam the 
highways, terrorizing unwary travel-
lers. Only an effective police force 
stands between civilization and 
anarchy. Our hero Max (Mel Gib-
son) is one of the brave cops who 
risk their lives cruising the roads, 
pursuing evil marauders. Max is 
married to a beautiful woman (who 
worries about his moods) and is 
father to a beautiful child. Before 
the movie is over, his family will be 
slaughtered by the worst motor-
cyclist on a raunchy continent. After 
taking his revenge, Max becomes an 
alienated wanderer. 
Mad Max serves its purpose. It 
attempts to answer the eternal ado-
lescent question, "Why do I feel so 
sorry for myself?" It comes up with 
an appropriate fable, culled from 
the movies of Clint Eastwood, 
Charles Bronson, and the other mili-
tary/vigilante heroes fantasized by 
Hollywood. The movie is not much 
fun, though. It alternates between 
miscalculated sentiment-Max's 
rambling love speeches to his wife-
and miscalculated attempts to evoke 
male camaraderie on the highway 
patrol. The action sequences are so 
sparse that we start to wonder what 
happened. Did Miller literally run 
out of gas? 
He still had a movie to make. Mad 
Max was a big hit with youthful 
audiences, so he got the chance and 
also the money to make it. Running 
out of gas is the fear but not the fate 
of the wonderful characters who 
populate The Road Warrior. The 
place is still Australia, the time a 
little further in the future. World 
War III has come and gone. All that 
seems to be left of the universe are a 
few well-paved highways, where des-
perate drivers cruise in search of 
fuel. The premise seems to be satir-
ical, but Miller does not present it 
that way. For the movie's duration 
this is the world we live in. Fighting 
and gasoline count, not much else. 
Enter Mad Max, at a hundred and 
ten miles an hour. He travels in a 
souped-up wreck of a car, his dog at 
his side. Glancing out the window, 
Max can't help but notice a couple 
of sports on a motorcycle pulling up 
next to him. The big one in front 
(Vernon Wells) wears a Mohawk 
hairdo. He is attired in leather and 
metal. Behind him sits his albino 
boyfriend. As Paul Newman once 
said, "Who are these guys, anyway?" 
Hostilities commence. Max shoots 
the big guy with a formidable dart. 
A little later, while he drains the 
gas from a truck full of corpses, the 
cyclists show up once more. They 
don't attack. The big guy rears up 
on the motorcycle, screaming de-
fiance. He tears the dart from his 
arm, then turns the cycle around 
and races away. 
No one since Homer has 
done fights so well and 
given us so much reason 
to wonder at them. 
The big guy is Achilles. No, the 
film doesn't call him that, but he's 
Achilles all the same, the unreflec-
tive, unstoppable warrior with his 
inevitable companion Patrocles. 
We will see more of Achilles and 
Patrocles later. In the meantime 
Max goes on to the next stop. He 
investigates a seemingly abandoned 
flying machine-a sort of go-cart 
helicopter-and is surprised by a 
gangly fellow with bad teeth who 
jumps out of the sand where he had 
buried himself. The ambusher 
(Bruce Spence) has laid a trap for 
passersby. With the help of his dog, 
Max outsmarts him. What will the 
unfortunate aviator bid for his free-
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dom? He will take Max to a magical 
place where the last refinery in the 
world is operating. 
Now the film begins to take shape. 
The refinery turns out to be pro-
tected by a fortress . Flame-throwing 
guns guard not only the oil but a 
besieged community living over it. 
Outside the walls are camped the 
warriors of the Humungus, a strong 
man with an executioner's mask. 
Inside the gates is a relatively peace-
able community. There are warriors 
among them : an Amazon, a few gun-
ners, the Feral Kid (a near-infant 
who wields a deadly boomerang). 
For the rest of it, the refinery people 
are punk in style but bourgeois in 
aspiration. Everyone wants to get 
to the beach, hundreds of miles 
away, where the Heavy Metal types 
have not penetrated. The commun-
ity is prevented from going any-
where by the Humungus and his 
forces . 
The movie gets a kind of rhythm 
going. One absurdity follows on 
another. Each absurdity makes 
sense in its particular context. Sel-
dom has a tall tale been narrated 
with just this mixture of humor and 
intensity. From the moment when 
the Humungus struts in front of the 
refinery, we know pretty much 
where the story is headed. Max will 
charm the refinery people by his 
invincible sullenness and driving 
skills. They will plead that he save 
them. He will reluctantly agree to 
do so. There will be a chase where 
Max, the Humt,mgus, Achilles (mad-
dened, of course, by the death of 
Patrocles), and the Feral Kid all have 
it out together. These events are 
preordained, yet each successive 
scene produces its own surprise, its 
own pleasure. 
One revealing moment in The 
Road Warrior comes during an early 
assault on the refinery. Achilles 
fights in the army of the Humun-
gus. He is the best and most cour-
ageous warrior of the bunch. When 
he comes vaulting on to the walls of 
the fortress, he kills people with a 
wonderful lyric enthusiasm. This 
is his life: he gets caught up in it, 
inspired. We have just been watch-
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ing the defenders of the fortress 
enjoy burning cyclists with flame-
throwers. Faced by Achilles, every-
body panics. Achilles finishes off 
one of his opponents after a spectac-
ular triple back-flip, accompanied, 
if I recall , by a magnificent war cry. 
Two different styles of slaughter are 
set against each other. Incinerating 
thugs is acknowledged to have its 
pleasures, but it can't compare-it 
can't keep up-with the primitive 
warrior's complete engagement. 
Of recent U.S. films, the 
one that comes nearest 
in mood and material to 
The Road Warrior is 
Raiders of the Lost Ark. 
This kind of distinction matters. 
It raises the question of what is pos-
sible from violence, of how the ex-
perience of fighting might matter 
in different cultures. Miller sets up 
other dramas of combat in much the 
same way. Each killing has its point; 
each contributes to a larger clash of 
assumptions. Max, the aviator, the 
Feral Kid , Achilles, the Amazon , 
and the gunners all contribute to 
the mixture. Because everyone risks 
-or suffers-an appropriate kind 
of death, The Road Warrior becomes 
an action movie with an unusual 
sense of proportion. The movie 
shares with epic the premise that 
physical struggle has an internal 
logic revealed by narration, evident 
to the reader or spectator if not to 
the combatants. 
Of recent American movies, the 
one that comes nearest in mood and 
material to The Road Warrior is Raid-
ers of the Lost Ark. The difference 
between the films is suggestive in 
several ways. The Spielberg/Lucas 
concoction has a complex mystery 
plot, but it comes off as a series of 
set-pieces, each-as it seems-dis-
tracting from the others. The Road 
Warrior is all set-pieces, yet it never 
leaves its one world of desert com-
bat; it uses limitations of time and 
space to give the sense of a cumula-
tive, evolving narrative that isn't 
really there. Harrison Ford and Mel 
Gibson are both plausible leading 
men. The former, however, must 
carry the story on his own and the 
weight is too great. He's not enough 
of a character. Gibson isn't either, 
but he inhabits a world where there 
are six or seven other memorable 
personalities, and just as he strength-
ens their presence so do they 
strengthen his. Raiders ' best mo-
ments come in its first ten minutes. 
The Road Warn·or builds to a genuine 
climax-a meeting of minds (or 
bodies) more exhilarating and 
alarming than anything I can re-
member from a movie of this kind. 
A much-praised moment in Raid-
ers summarizes the difference be-
tween this movie and The Road War-
rior. After a series of hand-to-hand 
combats, Harrison Ford gets tired 
of fighting and shoots the last in a 
long series of opponents, a huge, 
turbaned villain flashing a scimitar. 
It is as though director and star have 
suddenly tired of their shenanigans. 
They reject one diversion to move 
to another-and who can blame 
them, given the repetitiveness of the 
material? In The Road Warrior, no 
episode could be halted by this 
jokey means. The movie's course-
particularly its deaths-must follow 
a pattern less arbitrary, more read-
able. The movie is diverting in its 
avoidance of the arbitrary, whereas 
Raiders claims to amuse us through 
sheer will-power: this happened, and 
this, and this. 
Since this is a peculiar time in 
American history-since the pros-
pect of a Central American war is far 
from negligible- I hesitate about 
any film where the fun is in the vio-
lence. Bob Greene, the Chicago Trib-
une columnist, recently wrote that 
he wished he had fought in Vietnam. 
Greene feels that war is an inval-
uable educational experience, one 
no prospective soldier should re-
ject. We fight in order to under-
stand ourselves. This seems to me a 
foolish idea, the sort of perception 
that might be expected from a per-
son with fewer years and fewer op-
portunities for knowing the world. 
You can make a case for fighting 
wars, but not on the basis of self-
improvement. 
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Greene might be better off going 
to see The Road Warrior once every 
week or so. Few films can better sat-
isfy the desire for significant vio-
lence, for death as a form of mean-
ing. Can we satisfy this desire in real 
life? Before we try, we might think 
long on Miller's artistry-on the 
many adjustments necessary before 
even a movie can get such sensations 
over to us. Marinetti's glorification 
of war was an attempt to make life 
into art. It is better to keep art where 
it belongs: in this case, up on the 
screen. The Road Warrior succeeds 
brilliantly in doing this-always 
assuming that we know how to 
watch it. c~ 
Errata revisited. In my last column 
(September 1983), a sentence to-
wards the end of page 27 reads: "We 
see the diva herself singing." That 
sentence was intended to read: "We 
see the diva hear herself singing." 
Anyone who turns back to the essay 
will note that the additional word is 
vital. The same column makes a 
passing reference to Marion Davies' 
singing career. So far as I know, 
Marion Davies danced but did not 
sing. 
And She Shall Be a Sign 
(to Emma Dau Bertram) 
The oak has stopped her whimpering against the house 
and traffic's slowed , and now the quarter-hour only 
pings beyond the doors closed carefully. 
Stillness is 
a shawl spun from conspiracy tonight, for you dream past 
exhaustion and must heal awhile, before it's time. 
From shadows stuck to portraits lined like trophies 
on the wall, I watch your frailty disturb the sheets 
and wonder-do you ride alone tonight, your face against 
the sorrel's mane, your hair once more unbound for 
singing with the wind? 
Or do you both, still handsome 
newlyweds, race breakneck 'cross the plains the 
matching mares that balk at any voice but yours? Or 
is one waiting riderless beside the barn for only you 
to come? 
Now are you trotting lazily in stride along 
the brook researching birches for an opening too narrow 
for wagons others drive sedately into town? Or 
do you whistle back at larks to make him laugh, in vain? 
A game I play to stay the hour when he awakes, and you 
a breath away, for miracles. 
A fairy tale to keep your magic blanketed and him from 
needing his "beloved saint" so soon. 
Oh why this dread 
of spells you cast to make him smile through pain and 
think of riding one more night with you again? Of 
only sleight-of-hand? 
Or is it something more 
in comprehensible? 
Lois Bertram Reiner 
November, 1983 
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Poetry and Fame 
Charles Vandersee 
Dear Editor, 
While teaching poetry this fall it 
has occurred to me that three or four 
hours of work is no great price to 
pay for immortality. That amount 
of time, according to his friend 
Charles Armitage Brown, is what 
Keats spent on the "Ode to a Night-
ingale." Keats spent it in a chair on 
the lawn of a house near London, on 
a morning in 1819, when probably 
most male Londoners were lifting, 
scrivening, sweeping, or otherwise 
tediously employed. It took only 
three other such odes, a handful of 
sonnets, and "The Eve of St. Agnes" 
to assure Keats his immortality. 
Poetry is like that, the quickest 
way to fame yet devised, other than 
mass murder. It is an excellent ex-
ample of how ill-managed the world 
is, that blue sphere that seems from 
moon distance as if it ought to be as 
orderly as it is round. Coleridge 
received "Kubla Khan" in an opium 
dream. Poe sat down to write about 
the death of a beautiful woman, and 
after the merest few minutes (to hear 
him tell it) arrived at his refrain, 
Charles Vandersee 's poem "Remem-
bering the Present," in the September 
issue of Poetry, is about a physicist. 
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"Nevermore," after which "The 
Raven" pretty much wrote itself. In 
a well-managed world this will not 
happen. There is a correlation be-
tween time spent and the product 
resulting. Only long labor produces 
greatness. Poetry thus violates our 
sense of fitness, as a novel, a play, 
a symphony, a painting, a building 
do not. No wonder everyone tries 
to write poems. 
No wonder also that nobody reads 
them, these little strings of words, 
product of an hour, which often re-
quire an hour to make sense of. For 
value, one should watch Dallas, each 
episode requiring hours of labor in 
the blinding sun of a studio by all 
those people listed in the credits. 
The additional satisfaction of Dallas 
is to know that they're doing it for 
us, the "consumer." With the poem, 
who knows who it's for? What is 
Coleridge's hallucination to me, or 
Keats' nightingale, or Robert 
Lowell's Cousin Warren Winslow, 
or Emily Dickinson 's harmless little 
garden snake that gives her a spin-
sterly nineteenth-century chill? 
These are not rhetorical questions, 
leading toward an appeal to some 
deeper quality within us that inex-
plicably "needs" poetry . While I 
sometimes get caught up in my 
teaching, making the grand claims 
that any impassioned pedagogue 
ought to put forth , not apologizing, 
I doubt that poetry is for everybody. 
To say this implies, of course, the 
converse, that poetry is an elitist 
preoccupation, but I don't believe 
that either. Poetry is for people of 
all types and stations who have in 
common the liking of words and a 
suspicion of the things people know 
are so. We are a nonviolent minority, 
and you cannot tell us by our T-
shirts or our politics. 
"Things people know are so" 
sums up the world under normal 
circumstances, the world everybody 
recognizes, the very stuff around us. 
Its essence is war, which I take to be 
the chief message of our basic West-
ern text, the Bible. God, not satisfied 
with one man and one beautiful blue 
globe (an ideal one-to-one ratio), 
created another being. Still unsatis-
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fied- indeed, displaying perversity 
-he created more beings, and short-
ly one murdered the other. God 
gambled with the original fitness of 
things and accomplished a disorder 
which we have since accepted as the 
normal order. 
Poetry violates our 
sense of fitness, as 
a novel, a play, a 
symphony, a painting, a 
building do not. 
That normal order, in our time, 
has become a world in which people 
strive to consume, to conquer, and 
to coexist in Rube Goldberg struc-
tures called families and nations. 
The setup is absolutely wrong; what 
is right is one man or one woman on 
each globe in the cosmos. It is good 
for man to be alone, in the inex-
haustible variety of the creation pro-
duced for him. Nothing could be 
better. Yahweh's tampering was the 
great tragedy of history , and the 
poet is that voice which most power-
fully reminds us of how wr~ng 
things have gone. The poet does not 
write with reconciliation in mind, 
or rationalization, at the end. 
Poets have various ways of saying 
how wrong things have gone, and 
for this reason too it is no wonder 
no one reads them. A person is al-
ready dispossessed, forced to seek 
so many of his truths in mere words 
rather than directly. Who can blame 
him if he turns away from the TV, 
pressing hands over his chest to keep 
the phlegm from rising? Why, nau-
seated, should he turn to poetry, 
which he knows intuitively is not 
therapy but exponential reality? 
That I might drink . and leave the world 
unseen ./ 
And with thee fade away into the forest 
dim ./ 
Fade far away. dissolve. and quite forget 
What thou among the leaves hast never 
known./ 
The weariness. the fever. and the fret 
Here. where men sit and hear each other 
groan ... ./ 
The thing to hold in mind is the 
reason the poet takes the stance he 
does. The poet, unlike the novelist 
or playwright or architect, does not 
have to submit to the authority of 
what I will call the "generally-
agreed-upon." We all agree that we 
need a roof and a way for the air to 
circulate. The architect designs ac-
cordingly. We agree that war is 
normal, and the playwright there-
fore gives us wives and husbands 
embattled; the novelist shows us 
classes and villages and states and 
values coming to blows. 
The poet recognizes such reality 
(as in the Keats passage just quoted, 
from the "Ode"), but he does not 
submit to its authority. Necessity is 
not sovereign; something else is. To 
think this, in the normal human 
cave of the generally-agreed-upon, 
without light or much air, is intoler-
able. Also weird, and worse, an-
archic. The poet has no authority 
besides the self, or, to put a finer 
point on it, the imagination that 
constitutes the self. The Keats ode is 
strictly Keats' nightingale ; it is not 
the agreed-upon nightingale. Any 
real poem is this way, and if 75 per 
cent of the poems in our time, and 
all time, are simply cave poems, in 
ordinary cave language, as plain to 
the eye as any large region of dark-
ness is, this still does not say any-
thing about real poetry. Such as this: 
Let seed be grass. and grass turn into hay : 
I'm martyr to a motion not my own ; 
What's freedom for? To know eternity. 
I swear she cast a shadow white as stone. 
But who cou ld count eternity in days? 
These old bones live to learn her wanton 
ways:/ 
(I measure time by how a body sways). 
That is Theodore Roethke (1908-
1963), in overdrive, a terrible per-
son, like all real poets: solipsistic, 
bestower of alarming surprises, a 
sojourner on earth in love with 
words and forms and the flow of 
imagination, a saboteur of things as 
they are (check out how he tells 
time). 
It does not take much effort to 
meet Roethke's woman, but it takes 
a lot of imagining to know her. "I 
knew a woman," the poem opens, 
"lovely in her bones." A poem is 
lovely that way too. In a novel you 
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spend several evenings getting to 
know a woman, and the more she is 
the-way-women-are, or are supposed 
to be (we teachers call this "verisi-
militude"), the more you admire her 
and her maker. An hour with Roeth-
ke's language-woman and you are 
not much concerned with the-way-
women-are. A different authority 
has made itself known. 
Since a poet need not exalt verisi-
m ilitude as sovereign, the writer 
(and the reader) of a poem is indeed 
a terrible person. You might raise 
your children to be novelists, but 
you will not raise them to be poets. 
Poets conspire with a different au-
thority from those that people are 
presently dying under: suspicion of 
what the deep mind (the imagina-
tion) might produce, and fear of 
what it has already brought forth. 
It is generally agreed that a child 
must be trained into something 
much worse, an accommodator. 
I see that this has turned into that 
impassioned pedagoguery men-
tioned earlier. Perhaps on another 
occasion we can get at this a different 
way, as God at Bethlehem tried to 
establish a new rhetoric or Word, 
even though his subject matter re-
mained the same: His cosmic rest-
lessness, his failure to cease creation 
with the oneness of Adam, or, as 
viable compromise, to give each 
new being an Edenic planet of its 
own. 
This the poet remembers, even 
though we fail to . The poet recog-
nizes the curse that we ~11 are to 
each other, in the sense that each of 
us cries out to understand and be 
understood. The staggering effort 
in all this! The woe and chagrin of 
only partial success. Adam, by con-
trast, had the ear of God. He was not 
alone. He needed no one else, hav-
ing the perfect Ear. Daily they walk-
ed and talked in the Garden to-
gether, talk being the most intimate 
communion, a constancy, a possi-
bility at every moment, as touch 
and sex are not. That was immor-
tality for Adam, the thing we our-
selves flounderingly crave, to have 
perfect words register in a Forgetless 
Memory. Adam must have been 
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what today we call a poet-what 
kind of deity would put up, every 
day, with the small talk of our 
agreed-upon world? 
The poet remembers, or imagines, 
what things were like in those days, 
in that place. In our world of things-
as-they-are, this inspiration of Eden 
is of course suspect, as is the poet's 
claim to his own personal authority. 
This is because, in the corruption of 
our rhetoric, we think imagination 
is mere nostalgia. And we confuse 
authority with dominion. The poet 
is nonviolent, seeks no empire, is in 
Eden for the purpose of testing the 
quality of his talk by talking to God. 
And by talking about things that 
might matter to God, whose own 
unfathomable imagination made all 
that is. 
The poet is content with that. He 
boldly visits Eden (to put it another 
way) because naming has never been 
finished, and he has the authority 
to help. But he does not lead a chil-
dren's crusade there, or try to pave 
it. No matter how secular or egoistic 
or ambitious the writer appears, the 
writer who is really a poet is talking 
only to God, the perfect Ear. You 
cannot put "Dear God" before every 
poem you meet, but the voice of 
every real poem will tell you 
whether it is blather about things-as-
they-are or a voice sufficiently sure 
of its own authority to claim the ear 
of the Absolute. Keats does that with 
his "Nightingale." God wi ll listen 
to that nightingale more excitedly 
than to his own because the common 
nightingale is merely God's own 
efflux, whereas Keats' is the efflux 
of God and man together. 
The poet is not soft, mystical, and 
de l icious. And the poet can err. 
Parts of Eden are glorious thickets, 
seductive growth, a dark temptation 
to return to the quotidian cave. And 
there are many regions in Eden; no 
poet dare quite follow another poet's 
map. A poet cannot even say he has 
been in Eden-at least not directly. 
Regardless of subject or theme or 
mood, the evidence of his residency 
there will be his double freshness, of 
perception and of expression. When 
we as readers recognize those qual-
ities well enough to swear by them, 
then we have become for the time 
being the ears of God. We can then 
understand that because God craves 
new things, and is terribly restless, 
as we recall from his initial tragic 
mistake, he sometimes blesses im-
mensely a mere three or four hours 
spent in Eden: eager to hear the 
results. 
It is not a reasonable thing, this 
occasional immense yield for so little 
time and labor, but in the only real 
world, which is to say the coming to-
gether of the terrestrial and the 
supernal, it is the way things are. 
From Dogwood, yours faithfu lly, 
C.V. C: 
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By Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs. 
New York: Longmans. 240 pp. $8.95. 
This is a book to keep at hand 
when you read the daily paper or 
watch television. It is a cogent and 
penetrating study of how the media 
report- and rearrange- political 
news, and an invaluable guide to 
what to look for when you listen to 
or read about it. This is not an at-
tack on the media, an expose, or a 
"this is how it really is" book. It is 
a solidly researched study done by 
two political scientists who have 
done their homework and who can 
write up the results in clear, under-
standable prose for the general 
reader. 
The thesis of the book is not com-
plicated. The majority of people get 
their political information from the 
media. What we get is not reality, 
but fantasy, which (unfortunately) 
becomes a substitute for reality. The 
world of politics as presented by the 
media is neither news nor fact but 
melodrama, a kind of running soap 
opera. In one of the most revealing 
quotations in the book, Reuven 
Frank, producer of NBC Nightly 
News, tells us precisely this: 
Every news story should . without any sac-
rifice of probity or responsibility. d isplay 
the attributes of fi ction. of drama. It should 
have structure and conflict. problem and 
denouement. rising action a nd falling ac-
tion. a beginning, a middle a nd an end . 
These are not only the essentia ls of dra ma ; 
they are the essentials of narrative. 
What the media do, then, is to im-
pose on a political event a dramatic 
structure which is not there, making 
a "happening" which satisfies our 
need to make sense out of it and to 
see the story-line concluded. "Medi-
ated" politics is thus primarily a 
literary act, an illusion given the 
status of reality. 
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This has been said before by Mar-
shall McLuhan and others but rarely 
so aptly and convincingly. The im-
mediate reaction of the reader is 
"Of course. Why didn't I see this 
before?" The fact that the emperors 
of news have no clothes becomes 
even more evident as the authors 
document their thesis. One of the 
charms of the book is that each read-
er can supply his or her own exam-
ples of non-events which the media 
turn into daytime TV epics. A rela-
tively recent one is the Williams-
burg "summit," attended by 3500 
reporters, who except for a few never 
got within a mile of the meetings, 
and who crowned every delegate a 
winner in his home country. 
Part I, "Mass Mediated Politics," 
deals with what the media do with 
and to political news- television, 
magazines, press, films- including 
an especially insightful look at the 
politicization of sports via TV. Four 
case studies- Vietnam, Three Mile 
Island, Iran, and the crash of Flight 
191-show how the media add story-
line, heroes, villains, conflict, crisis, 
and resolution to create fictitious 
narratives that bear about as much 
resemblance to actuality as the story 
of the Three Little Pigs does to 
house construction. Anyone can 
supply additional cases. One of my 
favorites is the coverage of Presi-
dent Nixon's visit to China, which 
completely frustrated the corres-
pondents who covered it. We were 
treated to endless shots of Chinese 
riding bicycles in front of the Im-
perial Palace, while some reporters 
were reduced to interviewing each 
other. John Chancellor, in despera-
tion, even reported what he had for 
breakfast. 
Political campaigns, of course, fit 
Frank's formula so well that cam-
paign managers plan strategies to 
meet its requirements. By 1976, 
media people at national conven-
tions began to outnumber delegates, 
and what Cronkite or Chancellor or 
Walters said became the reality. 
This reviewer remembers vividly 
one hapless delegate in 1980 who, 
when asked how his delegation was 
going to vote, said, "I don't know, I 
haven 't been listening to Dan 
Rather." The New Hampshire pri-
mary, one remembers, was utterly 
meaningless until the media de-
cided otherwise. Campaign debates 
have little to do with substantive 
issues but provide winners and 
losers, so we have them. ABC, in 
fact, in the Reagan-Carter debates 
decided Reagan had won within 
minutes after they concluded . The 
polls meanwhile add suspense-
who's ahead? Louis Harris, in one 
of the least useful polls ever taken 
in American politics, reported in 
April, 1981, that Kennedy was lead-
ing Mondale for the Democratic 
nomination three-and-a-half years 
hence. Thus, politics becomes ritual 
drama, a fantasy of mediated in-
formation. 
To keep this review within 
bounds, one must summarize the 
remaining chapters, though their 
subject matter is no less relevant to 
the book's thesis. "The Re-presenta-
tion of History in Popular Culture 
Media" deals with the use of the past 
as melodrama, tailored to fit con-
temporary politics. The "docudra-
ma," television's child and the direct 
descendant of the feature story and 
popular theater, becomes instant 
history, providing the illusion of 
truth ("This is what really hap-
pened") with the fiction of partici-
pation ("You are there"). Thus we 
have had FDR (3), King, Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy (3), Patton, 
and many others, plus Watergate, 
Roots, Holocaust, World War II, 
Guyana, The Blue and the Gray, and 
dozens of family sagas covering cen-
turies of American history. Popular 
magazines, too, deal in political 
melodrama. Presidential wives 
make excellent material for fiction 
at the checkout lines-from Martha 
Washington to Nancy Reagan. 
Part II, "Group-Mediated Poli-
tics," is concerned with pack and 
group journalism (with a shrewd 
analysis of Washington Week in Re-
view) ; the mass-mediated fantasy of 
the electronic church of TV evan-
gelism; the melodrama of Good and 
Evil (both from the Right and Left) 
as played out in pipe-dreams of con-
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spiracy theory, among other topics. 
The authors' conclusion carries a 
warning: 
A totally mediated politics is only one step 
removed from totally controlled polit ics, 
that is , a totalitarian global village of care-
fully calculated a nd ma nipulated fa ntas ies. 
Reality is complex and confusing 
-we would rather have simple 
explanations, ones which satisfy our 
need for conclusions. The media 
give us the kind of reality we prefer. 
This book is worth reading and 
thinking about-you won't watch 
politics on TV or read about it in 
the papers the same way afterwards. 
Cl Russel B. Nye 
The Noel Coward Diaries 
Edited by Graham Payn and Sheridan 
Morley. Boston: Little, Brown. 698 pp. 
$22.50. 
In June, 1955, Noel Coward re-
vived his career by performing his 
music at The Desert Inn, Las Vegas, 
Nevada. He basked in rave notices, 
which contrasted with his treatment 
in the British press during the pre-
vious ten years. In the full glow of 
his American triumph, he wrote the 
following in his diary : 
Light music has been despised a nd re-
jected in England for years. Modern mu sic, 
including variations of jazz. is not con-
sidered important by the savants. Benjamin 
Britten, yes , with all his arid . se lf-conscious 
dissonances, but then that is " serious" and 
"significant. " Here, light mu sic has its own 
genuine values. which are recognized not 
only by the public but by the press. The 
orchestral arrangements and variations are 
incredible-vital and imaginative. Some-
times they go too far for my own personal 
taste, but I cannot fail to be impressed by 
the expert knowledge of instrumentation. 
Pete Matz [Coward 's American accom-
panist). at the age of twenty-six . knows 
more about the range of various instru-
ments and the potentialities of different 
combinations than anyone of any age I have 
ever met in England . I suppose mu sic is in 
the air more here and the mixture of Jewi sh 
and Negro rhythms has become part of the 
national consciousness becau se it is a gou-
lash of all races. Very exciting a nd stimu-
lating. 
Coward's friend, Graham Payn, 
and theatre critic Sheridan Morley 
have edited the diaries lightly, cut-
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ting only when required by British 
libel laws, or to avoid repetitions. 
The diaries cover the years from 
1941 to 1969, three years before 
Coward's death at age 73. The 698 
pages of closely printed text include 
a chronology and a useful index. In 
addition to a brief introduction, 
Payn and Morley briefly summarize 
each year's entries. They have rec-
ognized that most readers will seek 
special topics and that fewer will 
plod through. 
For it is a plod, and passages such 
as the one quoted above come along 
less frequently than you wish . There 
are pages and pages of information 
about the sufferings of Coward's 
friends and relations. These he 
visited regularly on an annual trek 
from London to New York, Jamaica, 
the Riviera, Switzerland, Paris, and 
back to London. It is an unconscious 
comedy of the diaries, Coward's 
struggle to find company and then 
escape it. I say "unconscious" be-
cause it is one of the few topics he 
fails to comment on, and he is a keen 
observer of his own temperament, 
as well as others'. Matters of recur-
ring interest include: actresses more 
concerned with their hair and ward-
robe than Coward's words and mu-
sic; his war with the British press; 
his worries about his health, his 
money, and his homes; his criticisms 
of the British and American ways 
of life. 
He was a monarchist to the back-
bone and my favorite entry-be-
cause Coward seems closest to what 
he valued most in life-expresses 
his pleasure in friendship with the 
royal family and his displeasure 
with those who don't appreciate 
their betters: 
Thursday 23 Janu ary [1947] The 
show [Pacific 1860] went well but Mary 
[Martin] was not good . The King and 
Queen received me in the second interval. 
Mary distinguished herself by saying 
to Princess Margaret Rose (Princess Eliz-
abeth being absent), "Give my regards to 
your sister. Bye-bye for now." I drove away 
to Dickie's a nd Edwina's house in Chester 
Street, where the King and Queen were . I 
sat next to the Queen at supper. It was all 
very family: only the King and Queen, 
Princess Margaret, all the Mountbattens 
and me. We talked about many things , from 
the Labour Government to E. Nesbit [one 
of Coward's favorite authors] . The King 
was gay and relaxed . After dinner I sang a 
few songs . It was all very lovely and I felt 
most proud to be there . 
Coward hated Labour govern-
ments, British taxes, weather, and 
laws against homosexuality. Apart 
from their love of light music, Amer-
icans were naive, ill-mannered 
prudes who seemed too interested in 
making money to consider spending 
it well, except when they disgorged 
fabulous amounts into the Coward 
coffers for television appearances 
and recording contracts. His long 
friendship with Alfred Lunt and 
Lynne Fontanne sometimes took 
him to their Wisconsin home and, 
annually, he visited the University 
of Chicago hospital for a physical 
exam by the only doctor he trusted. 
Aside from these excursions, Amer-
ica meant New York two or three 
times a year. 
In artists' diaries, you look for 
clues about how the artist works. 
Coward shares little with us, but not 
because he has highfalutin notions 
about a sacred calling. On the con-
trary, any such "pretentious balls"-
a favorite term of condemnation-
meant creative paralysis. Coward 
has little to say because the "artistic 
process" seems so obvious to him. 
One has one's work, one's obliga-
tions to co-workers, backers, family, 
and friends, and one gets on with it. 
He was a diligent and rapid worker. 
The following entry is typical: 
Sunday 18 August [ 1963[ These four 
weeks have been tremendously valuable . . 
I've really got through a lot of work . I've 
finished a story. It is about 40,000 words . 
I have also typed and revised it. It's really 
very good, and although at one point I got 
a bit panicky and stuck . I surmounted the 
hurdle and the end is now charming. I have 
also got on quite a lot with Not Yet the 
Dodo. I do love writing verse. I have also 
been right through the book of High Spirits, 
making notes , cuts. revisions , etc., as well 
as having done the trio and soliloquies for 
The Girl Who Came to Supper when I first 
arrived . 
The tone of the diaries is chatty, 
off-hand, but serious, on the whole; 
the wit of the songs is missing. The 
themes are love, betrayal, illness, 
death, friendship, and envy. By the 
end, you feel you know Coward 
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quite well. He was opinionated but 
never disagreeable; a hard-working 
writer and composer who concealed 
the drudgery of his craft; a loyal 
friend; an adventurous traveler; a 
jolly good chap who shrank from 
"matey"-ness. I disagreed with most 
of his political opinions, but they 
are not important. I admired his 
attitude toward his work and the 
length and breadth of his career, 
which is important. I never particu-
larly wanted to see his plays, read 
his stories, or hear his music, but 
now I do. 
c: Arvid F. Sponberg 
Slouching Towards 
Kalamazoo 
By Peter De Vries. Boston: Little, Brown. 
241 pp. $13.95. 
Eastern sophisticates and standup 
comedians have made a number of 
jokes about Kalamazoo in the past, 
but likely no one has referred to 
this well-known Michigan city as a 
modern day Bethlehem. Perhaps 
only a novelist with Peter De Vries' 
literary awareness and religious 
perversity would have the audacity 
to construct a plot in which the cen-
tral character, a junior high school 
underachiever from North Dakota, 
slouches toward Kala)llazoo as an 
antichrist in search of the thirty-
year-old teacher whom he has gotten 
pregnant. And of all contemporary 
American novelists, only De Vries 
could turn such a plot into a novel 
that is both incredibly funny and 
deadly serious. 
Having reached the age of seven-
ty, De Vries has had plenty of prac-
tice at writing his unique kind of 
novel. Since The Tunnel of Love 
brought him prominence as a gifted 
comic writer in 1954, he has treated 
his small but loyal band of followers 
with eighteen novels in less than 
thirty years, an output matched 
only by his fellow New England 
writer, John Updike. Both De Vries 
and Updike began their careers on 
The New Yorker staff, both came 
from Dutch ancestry and Protestant 
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backgrounds, and both share a high-
ly polished literary style, an abiding 
interest in sex, marriage, and adult-
ery, and a deep concern for the 
spiritual bankruptcy of contempo-
rary American society. 
Whereas Updike explores his 
themes from inside his characters, 
De Vries skims along the surface of 
relatively thin plots and shallow 
characters, dashing off gags, puns, 
aphorisms, and one-liners with in-
credible ease. For all his surface 
comedy, however, De Vries reveals 
in all of his novels a darker and 
more pessimistic view of man and 
the modern world than does Updike. 
His comedy lies just beyond his 
tragic vision of the world. "The 
comic and the tragic are inextric-
ably amalgamated in life," De Vries 
has said. "It 's the Aristotelian prin-
ciple-you laugh at that which, if 
there were more of it, would be 
painful. Humor deals with that por-
tion of our suffering which is exempt 
from tragedy." 
The comic tone of Sloucht'ng To-
ward Kalamazoo is apparent from the 
opening passage when Anthony 
Thrasher, the hero-narrator of the 
novel, introduces his favorite teach-
er: "My old eighth-grade teacher, 
Miss Maggie Doubloon, said she 
was half Spanish, half French, and 
half Irish, a plethora of halves, not 
entirely unnoticed by some of the 
brighter pupils. Joke though it was, 
it well expressed her superabun-
dance of spirits, the verve and fire-
sheer spitfire, fire-in-the-belly fire-
that made her in the end decide that 
that golden oldie, The Scarlet Letter, 
had long been due for an overhaul; 
must, in fact, be dragged forcibly out 
of the gray, chill, toxic riverbottom 
fog of Puritan morality and up into 
the sunlight of sexually liberated 
twentieth-century America .... The 
modernization Miss Doubloon ef-
fected wasn't something she wrote-
she lived it. That naturally involved 
committing Hester Prynne's sin, in 
a North Dakota city of which the 
mayor, a precursor of today's Moral 
Majority, said on hearing she had 
assigned The Scarlet Letter to us 
eighth-graders, 'We're gonna tight-
en our Bible Belt! We're gonna 
show 'em we're the buckle of that 
belt!"' 
Miss Doubloon soon commits the 
scarlet sin with young Thrasher, for 
which he awards this modern day 
Hester Prynne an A-, a gag which 
she later turns to monetary advan-
tage by manufacturing and selling 
scarlet A-Plus T-shirts. But this is 
after she has become pregnant, been 
run out of Ulalume, North Dakota, 
and moved to Kalamazoo where her 
baby, appropriately named Ahab, is 
born . Wanting to be near his child, 
Anthony, disguised as a Yeatsian 
rough beast, follows Miss Doubloon 
to Kalamazoo where he gets a job 
with her uncle and falls in love with 
Bubbles Breedlove, "a buxom girl, 
with whorls of honey-colored hair 
to her shoulders, and a mouth like 
the inside of a jelly doughnut." In 
like manner, the plot tumbles on, 
from scene to madcap scene, until 
Anthony marries Bubbles in the 
end and, like most of De Vries' mid-
western protagonists, moves out 
east. 
The satire of the Anthony Thrash-
er-Maggie Doubloon-Bubbles Breed-
love plot already cuts fairly deep, 
but the more serious concerns of the 
novel are developed primarily 
through some of the minor charac-
ters. Contemporary religion is par-
ticularly pilloried. Back in Ulalume 
Anthony's father, a local minister, 
engages in a set of debates with the 
local atheist, debates that are so 
evenly matched that they are de-
clared draws. In each case, however, 
the minister and the atheist are con-
verted by each other. After the first 
debate, this causes Anthony's mother 
such trauma that she begins seeing 
the atheist-turned-Christian and 
leaves her minister-husband-turned-
atheist. Similar debates appear in 
De Vries' earlier novels , and 
De Vries always seems to be drawn 
as strongly to the one side as to the 
other. 
Even more devastating, however, 
is the portrayal of the eastern church 
for which Anthony becomes a fund 
raiser, the First Church of Christian 
Atheists. As Anthony explains, 
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"Christian atheism seems to me the 
most tolerable accommodation of 
faith and reason to each other for 
our time, providing a discipline of 
belief and necessary ethical impera-
tives on the one hand, and intellec-
tual realism on the other." When 
one potential donor hesitates be-
cause she believes in God, Anthony 
responds, "That's all right. We take 
all kinds." Likely this is De Vries' 
commentary on the contemporary 
Christian church, but it also suggests 
his own ambivalence, an ambiva-
lence not about the depravity of 
man but about the grace of God. 
Slouching Toward Kalamazoo is not 
Peter De Vries' best novel, but for 
readers who are not yet among his 
loyal readers, it is as good a place to 
begin as any. Since Penguin is com-
mitted to re-issuing all of his pre-
vious books, his entire corpus will 
soon be available to late converts. 
~~ Arlin Meyer 
When Bad Things 
Happen to Good People 
By Harold Kushner. New York: Scheck-
en. 149 pp. $10.95. 
Harold Kushner's When Bad 
Things Happen to Good People is a 
good book by the standard of judg-
ment suggested by its author. The 
book is at once entertaining and en-
grossing, partly because of Kush-
ner's skill in story-telling and grasp 
of common sense and partly because 
of the subject matter. Kushner has 
written a book that expresses his 
own personal struggle in such a way 
that clergy and laity alike can bene-
fit. He effectively reminds us of sit-
uations we have faced, of feelings 
we have felt, of challenges with 
which we have struggled; but, above 
all, he works consistently toward 
practical suggestions, applicable 
responses for those times when bad 
things happen. 
However, to fully understand 
Kushner's book (and thereby assess 
it) one must consider, we believe, 
four essential questions before deal-
ing with the text in any specific 
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fashion. First, what is Kushner's per-
sonal perspective? Second, what is 
Kushner's motivation in writing the 
book? Third, what theological per-
spective does Kushner bring to the 
issues of the book? Fourth, what is 
Kushner's assessment of the value 
of theology? 
Much is revealed by recognizing 
that Kushner is a congregational 
rabbi. His perspective is pastoral 
and not academic, which means he 
will tend to sacrifice the complexity 
of traditional responses to suffering 
in order to simplify proposals aimed 
·at the broad audience of the local 
congregation. This perspective is 
the filter through which all matters 
are translated and articulated. More 
specifically, Kushner aims to focus 
on the practical, immanent realm 
of experience rather than deal with 
the more difficult realm of the the-
oretical and the transcendent. 
In addition, Kushner is especially 
motivated to write about his own 
personal anguish experienced while 
confronting the reality of his son's 
disease and death. While the per-
sonal dimension of Aaron's illness 
adds much warmth to the book, 
Kushner's answers are molded by 
the troubling realization that certain 
"pastoral words" could not be "pas-
toral" to him as rabbi. For a member 
of the clergy, finding a pastor in 
situations of personal trauma is a 
difficult, sometimes disillusioning 
experience which raises questions 
that may not be ordinarily asked by 
the one who has a rabbi or pastor to 
turn to. (Clergy may well be espe-
cially attracted to this volume for 
that reason.) 
Kushner boldly admits the im-
pact of his own role as rabbi upon 
the eventual solutions offered. What 
the casual reader cannot see is that 
Kushner consistently aligns himself 
with a "Reconstructionist Jewish" 
view. While this view may well cor-
respond favorably with a common 
modern American view, Kushner's 
Reconstructionism should not be 
misunderstood as a "typically" Jew-
ish viewpoint. • In fact, because of 
the limited reception of Reconstruc-
tionism and the unique nature of 
some of its theology, Kushner in 
many ways stands in a theological 
tradition atypical of Judaism as a 
whole. Most especially, Kushner 
stands in a natural law tradition that 
has little place for any supernatural 
realm. To expect a supernatural 
position from Kushner would be to 
ask him to be what he is not. 
Finally, Kushner's efforts to sep-
arate his work from that of theology 
may represent more than just humil-
ity or even a desire to be practical. 
One could say that there is nothing 
essential to Judaism in the task of 
doing theology. Judaism tends to 
respond through theology rather 
than be rooted within it. That is to 
say, Judaism is not so much theo-
logically dependent as it is behavior 
oriented. We, who are theologians, 
may especially notice a lack of con-
cern over the authority of scripture 
(a theological issue) in Kushner's 
work. Yet, Kushner is consistent 
with his own tradition on this mat-
ter. We should be careful not to in-
troduce standards of theological 
judgment without realizing the alien 
nature of some of those standards 
for Kushner's thought. 
Nevertheless, a final assessment 
of Kushner's book may, eventually, 
rest more on his "theology" than he 
would have hoped. This theology is 
based on at least three principles. 
First, Kushner discounts any posi-
tion that would view God as any-
thing but a gracious, merciful father. 
For Kushner, this principle means 
openly challenging traditional Bib-
lical/Rabbinic views as less than 
*Kushner is consistent in his Reconstruction· 
ist position as can be noted by comparing the 
following passage from When Children Ask 
A bout God, published ten years earlier: 
God does not cause everything that hap-
pens in the world. Some things are the re-
sult of sheer accident, others are caused 
by men exercising their freedom in a harm-
ful way. 
God does not punish. Some people suffer 
as a direct result of their actions. but nat-
ural laws operate without making moral 
judgments. What God does is to provide 
resources of strength and faith for the vic-
tims of misfortune and resources of com-
passion for those around them , so that to-
gether they can go on living and building 
a life in spite of what happened. 
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adequate. In order to challenge tra-
ditional views for the sake of pro-
ducing a usable theology, Kushner 
has engaged himself in a debate that 
has become perhaps the most sig-
nificant of our time-the sufficiency 
of traditional theological language 
(more on this later). Second, Kush-
ner argues that any effort to deter-
mine the ultimate source of evil or 
suffering is fundamentally abstract 
and thus pastorally useless (not sur-
prising given Kushner's presuppo-
sitions listed above). Kushner would 
hold that suffering and evil are sim-
ply facts of experience; thus the pas-
toral, caring question is not "Why 
did bad things happen?" but rather 
"When bad things happen, what do 
we do or say now?" Third, Kushner 
argues that if God is merciful and 
evil is a fact of experience, we must 
logically conclude that the claim 
that "God is all-powerful" is false. 
The development of this theology 
is most striking in Kushner's re-
interpretation of fob (with a fas-
cinating interweaving of themes 
from Archibald MacLeish's ]B). In 
the Job story, Kushner sees three 
differing viewpoints represented in 
turn by Job's friends, Job himself, 
and the final editor of the story. 
Each of these viewpoints can be 
understood as part of a trilogy of 
interrelated propositions whose 
truth, according to -Kushner, be-
comes a problem only when bad 
things happen: 
A. God is all-powerful and causes every· 
thing that happens in the world . Noth-
ing happens without his willing it. 
B. God is just and fair , and stands for 
people getting what they deserve. so 
that the good prosper and the wicked 
are punished . 
C. Job is a good person. 
With the introduction of suffering, 
Kushner rightly argues that "we 
can now affirm any two [of these 
propositions] only by denying the 
third." Before countering this basic 
argument-it underscores the entire 
book-we recognize with apprecia-
tion Kushner's practical points. Cer-
tain traditional positions can be-
come pastorally cruel in the midst of 
30 
crisis situations. Indeed, some posi-
tions leave us with a God who can-
not be worshipped; can we worship 
an arbitrary , capricious God? In 
short, Kushner's basic premise is 
masterfully woven into the fabric of 
a very workable , very understand-
able pastoral theology. 
We would argue, however, that 
Kushner's claim that a believer 
could accept the three propositions 
given above under untroubled cir-
cumstances is problematic. For ex-
amble, proposition A runs contrary 
to the traditional picture of scrip-
ture in which free human choice is a 
vital part of what humanity is. What-
ever God's power is (and that power 
is given broad latitude in scripture) 
it is not that which causes everything 
to happen. In fact, the moral picture 
of God's activity in scripture is that 
of an insider in history often acting 
in concert with or in response to hu-
man free choice. Kushner's claim 
that we must accept a God with 
limited power may simply be taking 
swipes at a "straw God," more spe-
cifically, that abstract ultimate cause-
and-effect God of the philosophers 
and not the God of scripture. 
Nevertheless, even though we 
argue that scripture pictures God 
in quite different terms than that of 
cause and effect, we are convinced 
that Kushner's "limited-God" con-
cept is contradictory to the God of 
scripture and comes dangerously 
close to a God who does nothing at 
all directly. This picture of a limited 
God may be Kushner's weakest link 
because a God so pictured not only 
is left free of responsibility for evil 
but must also lose some account-
ability for creation, revelation, and 
redemption. Though scripture por-
trays God working in partnership 
with human activity, scripture also 
portrays God as one who works with 
power independent of human activ-
ity. Though we would hesitate to say 
that God is the cause of all things, he 
certainly must be given the ability 
to bring about the creation and to 
intervene for the sake of revelation 
and for the redemption of his peo-
ple. Perhaps Kushner gains a more 
comfortable and pastorally kind 
position with his argument, but he 
also loses the dynamic, independ-
ently active God. 
Proposition B is equally prob-
lematic. Though scripture is divided 
on this matter, its full thrust chal-
lenges the notion that God's justice 
must be judged on the basis of the 
good prospering and the wicked 
suffering. Kushner misreads the 
book of fob in claiming that Job 
finally judges God to be unfair since 
the good do not prosper (namely, 
Job, himself) while, in fact, Job at 
the end of the story does not give up 
on God's justice (cf., fob 41:1-5) and 
the book of Job as a whole challenges 
the view that the justice of God can 
be measured by the distribution of 
good fortune in the world. Job in-
stead ends with the realization of his 
own limitations. 
We would argue, with Job, that 
humans are limited in knowledge 
and capability under any circum-
stance regardless of whether they 
suffer or not, but the context of 
suffering often makes that point 
clearer to us. In concert with Job, 
we would rather say that the sweep 
of God's justice often escapes us; it 
may be unknowable in its entirety. 
In addition, we may not have cate-
gories to use or words to speak that 
would help us understand more 
fully God's justice. Rather than re-
solving the tension, as Kushner 
would want to do, the book of fob 
leaves the tension between the re-
vealed but not yet fulfilled prom-
ises of God and the ultimate justice 
of God by which all things are 
brought together. In the meantime, 
the notion of retributive justice 
seems to be on all accounts an in-
appropriate way to understand 
God's justice. 
Proposition C is, finally, a telling 
point in Kushner's position. Kush-
ner seems more ready to protect the 
goodness of the human (for the sake 
of good pastoral theology) than to 
maintain the status of God. The 
focus of the book is so centered on 
the strengths of "good" people that 
except for some passing remarks at 
book's end, we wonder if this book 
is little more than a new stoicism. 
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Kushner's closing comments-"Can 
you learn to love and forgive Him 
despite His limitations . . ." - re-
verses the pattern of our relation to 
God. We would rather say, Can we 
learn to love and forgive despite 
our limitations? 
Certainly with a supportive com-
munity and the spark of inner spir-
itual strength as the pillars of Kush-
ner's position, there seems to be 
little need for God (indeed, a limited 
God tends to offer little as well). Our 
doubts may be better placed on our 
own ability to sustain this suppor-
tive community and inner spiritual 
strength. Above all, Kushner has in 
effect put aside the key theological 
issue-how we with our limited re-
sources combat forces beyond us or 
move to the point of relating to the 
"unfathomable" -our God. There 
is an uncomfortable tension in that 
question, but perhaps we ought not 
to avoid uncomfortable tensions in 
favor of comfortable ~olutions, even 
when those solutions come in pack-
ages as nicely constructed and clear-
ly presented as Harold Kushner's 
When Bad Tht"ngs Happen to Good 
People. 
Our criticisms notwithstanding, 
this book provides an immediately 
accessible tool for dialogue simply 
because of its readability . Parish 
clergy might be engaging the ques-
tions of the book not only for their 
own sake but also for opening up 
reflection on the relation between 
Christians and Jews. Christians may 
wish to challenge certain arguments 
in the book, such as a naively posi-
tive view of human nature that ap-
pears to minimize human limita-
tions, or a view of justice that seems 
unable to provide a place within it 
for the notion of God's mercy. Still , 
Christians should find points of 
commonality with Jews in the book, 
as in the sense of community and the 
basic need for caring and sensitivity 
to individual needs and circum-
stances. If this book accomplishes 
nothing more than leading us to-
ward such points of contact, it is well 
worth recommending. 





Never had the old man made such a journey. 
His robes enfolded him like driving wind. 
No one remembered the old man running. Even fire 
had never moved him. His estates were the light 
of the town. Yet, there he was, running to a dark 
figure huddling the road. Love was flood-water 
carrying him forward. Some tried to dike the water; 
nothing could hold him. Love loosed a wind 
of words: "My son is coming home." Dark 
grief behind, the father ran, arms open as light. 
He had to lift the boy before his son's fire 
of sorrow burned the father's sandals. Journey? 
The old man could remember no other journey 
but this homecoming: he held his son in the fire 
of his arms, remembering his birth: water 
and fire. Servants ran along thrusting at the wind 
of excitement: what shall we do? what torchlight 
prepare? "Bathe away the pig-pen-slopping-dark 
that cloaks my son. Prepare a banquet. Jewel the dark 
with fires. My son was dead. My son is afire 
with life. The land is fruitful. Joy is its water. 
Where is my eldest son? The end of the journey 
is ours. My son, do you grieve? turn from the light 
to say you are unrewarded? Son, is the wind 
from the south closer than you to me? is the wind 
of your doubt stronger than my love for you? Water 
your hardness, my son. Be a brother to the dark 
of your brother's sorrow. Be a season of light . 
to his coming home. You will make many a JOurney 
through cities, up mountains, over abysses of fire, 
but for tonight and tomorrow, my eldest, fire 
your heart, strike at its stone. Let it journey 
toward dawning, be a thrust at the dark 
your brother will never forget. Find a woman o~ water 
and fire , seed her with sons for my name and wmd-
supple daughters for bearing daughters and sons of light. 
I am a father of journeys. I remind you the dark 
can be conquered by love-blazing fire. I made air and wind 










And the Last 
Shall Be Last 
Dot Nuechterlein 
I am a runner-sort of. Thirty 
minutes most mornings, three races 
this year (one five-kilometer and 
two five-milers), the determination 
to keep at it no matter what time 
pressures and bodily ailments inter-
vene-sounds like I belong to the 
ranks of the devoted, right? 
But somehow I don't really fit in 
with the club. That may be because 
I haven't been at it long enough to 
become caught up in the mystique. 
It may be because I already have a 
religion, thank you very much, and 
cannot claim the spiritual/emotional 
transformation others tell of. It may 
be because too much of my energy 
is absorbed by other commitments 
to get too tied to this one. 
But it is probably because I ain 
not very good at it. This is hardly 
surprising. Never once in my life-
time has anyone ever suspected me 
of having an athletic bone in my 
body. As a kid I was one of those stu-
dents who could usually get pretty 
decent grades in practically any-
thing I set my mind to, except phys. 
ed. Eventually I quit trying and took 
on the nonchalant air common 
among failures. 
Oh, occasionally I participated 
voluntarily in some sport or other, 
but the results were generally un-
pleasant. For example, never having 
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learned to swim properly I nonethe-
less spent a considerable portion of 
my teenage life at the beach-until 
the afternoon I nearly drowned. 
Later as a sorority member I ac-
ceded to my roommate's pleas to 
save the house from forfeiting the 
intramural volleyball champion-
ship when Asian flu laid low all of 
our reserve players-we lost the 
game, though, because the other 
group was smart enough to find the 
weak link on our side. 
Then there was that awful week-
end during junior year when a truly 
nice, great-looking fellow came all 
the way from Texas to pursue what 
had seemed a promising romance 
begun shortly before at a national 
student conference. First we went 
bowling, only to discover that there 
was nothing there to build a dream 
on. Next we tried golf; no, I tried, he 
looked pained. Not even ping pong 
worked. That last night we shook 
hands at the door. 
A fantastic relationship-
he did all that terrific 
stuff and I sat in the 
stands keeping score 
and screaming wildly. 
Now it isn't that I don't like sports, 
or jocks, either, for that matter. In 
fact, for three years in high school I 
went steady with a guy who was all-
everything: star football end, star 
basketball forward, star baseball 
shortstop-he also ran a little track 
on the side. It was a fantastic rela-
tionship- he did all that terrific 
stuff and I sat in the stands keeping 
score and screaming wildly. Today 
I am still good at playing the part of 
Super Fan, cheering my school's 
teams on to victory or suffering 
through their defeats. And I still 
like jocks. As long as they don't ex-
pect me to actually do anything. 
So my fondness for running is 
rather out of character. It started a 
decade ago but was only a sometime 
thing until last winter, when the 
clutter in the rec room got re-
arranged and yielded enough space 
for a mini running path. Being out-
side is nice, but conditions have to 
be right: temperature in the upper 
60s, a gentle breeze from time to 
time, enough cloud cover to shield 
the eyes, etc. We have had exactly 
four mornings like that here in 
1983, so mostly I just pull the shades, 
adjust the thermostat, turn on MTV 
to set the pace, and go. 
Why, I have been asked. For my 
health, of course. Also I like the half 
hour of solitude to plan the day or 
to write something in my head. And 
then there's the pounds lost and the 
lumps shifted around the midsec-
tion. But I sure don't do it for any 
sense of achievement. 
What finally separates me from 
the true enthusiasts is a lack of com-
petitive drive. Face me with a bridge 
table or a Scrabble board or a puzzle 
and .I'm out for blood, but not in 
racing. 
That was proven last spring in my 
very first race. It was a gorgeous 
day and I loved trotting along the 
lakeshore and through the woods. I 
was dead last. Yet as the course 
twisted along everyone else ran out 
of sight, and I could fantasize being 
up front leading the pack. 
They don't give prizes for also-
rans (although some argue that he 
who persists is as deserving of recog-
nition as he who is naturally gifted); 
in truth, people feel sorry for you. 
My children were embarrassed 
when I p laced #217 out of 217 and 
seemed relieved when I finished 
ahead of a few others in subsequent 
races. 
But for me, amazingly, this exer-
cise has turned out to be just plain 
fun. And how delightful it has been 
to find a physical activity in which 
I can lose without feeling like a 
loser. •• •• 
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